North South Transitions to Green Economies: Making Export Support, Technology Transfer, and Foreign Direct Investments Work for Climate Protection by Santarius, T. et al.
 
 
Heinrich Böll Foundation 
The Green Political Foundation  
Schumannstraße 8   10117 Berlin, Germany 
Phone +49(0)30.285 34-0    Fax +49(0)30.285 34-109     www.boell.de 
 
 
North South Transitions  
to Green Economies  
Making Export Support, Technology Transfer, and Foreign 


















By Tilman Santarius, Jürgen Scheffran, and Antonio Tricarico 
 
 
Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation 2012  
 
 
North-South Transitions to Green Economies 
 
Making Export Support, Technology Transfer, and Foreign Direct 





















Tilman Santarius, Freelance Author and Member of the Board, Germanwatch, Germany 
Prof. Dr. Jürgen Scheffran, Institute of Geography and KlimaCampus, University of 
Hamburg, Germany 




Edited by the Heinrich Böll Foundation 2012 
 
Published under the following Creative Commons License: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/. Attribution — You must attribute the 
work in the manner specified by the author or licensor (but not in any way that suggests 
that they endorse you or your use of the work). Noncommercial — You may not use this 
work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works — You may not alter, transform, or 
build upon this work. 
 
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, Schumannstr. 8, D-10117 Berlin, Germany 











For the hurried reader… .................................................................................... 4 
 
1. Introduction: Stepping Up Global Cooperation ............................................ 6 
Towards a sustainable and just energy transition .............................................. 8 
 
2. Export Support and Investment Governance for Climate Protection ....... 12 
A virtuous circle for sustainable technology transfer ....................................... 12 
Reducing risks and sharing benefits ................................................................ 13 
 
3. A Conceptual Framework for Technology Transfer ................................... 15 
What is sustainable technology transfer? ........................................................ 16 
Addressing barriers and obstacles to technology transfer ............................... 18 
 
4. Foreign Investments and Sustainable Development ................................. 21 
Lessons learned from past experiences .......................................................... 21 
Challenges in reforming international investment treaties ............................... 23 
 
5. Policies for the South: Governing Investment Inflows .............................. 26 
Building a science and technology infrastructure ............................................ 27 
Developing technology roadmaps and performance benchmarks ................... 28 
Creating climate-friendly market conditions ..................................................... 29 
Engaging the banking sector and regulating financial markets ....................... 34 
Deepening linkages, networks and partnerships ............................................. 35 
 
6. Policies for the North: Reforming Export Support ..................................... 37 
Limits of export credit agencies in supporting sustainable development ......... 38 
Can export credit agencies have a role in fighting climate change? ................ 40 
Principles for fair and effective support ........................................................... 44 
The case for a European Agency For Low-Carbon Technology Transfer ....... 45 
 
7. Conclusions: Towards a Global Green New Deal ...................................... 49 
 
References ...................................................................................................... 51 
 
  4
For the hurried reader… 
Greening the economy in the context of poverty alleviation and sustainable development 
rests on, among other things, the rapid and effective dissemination of climate-friendly 
technologies, namely renewable energies. 
The worldwide and sustainable transition of energy systems will only succeed if the 
economic and technological capacities of all countries are involved. Few developing 
countries already have considerable domestic production capacities for climate-friendly 
technologies. Therefore, the main task is to significantly scale-up production capacities 
for clean and energy-efficient technologies the world over.  
Enhancing global technology transfer requires significant financing and smart 
governance. Intensive global cooperation is needed so that know-how and resources 
from forerunner countries and companies can be tapped and made available for 
building-up production capacities and demand in developing countries, and for adapting 
technologies to local needs and circumstances for its most effective use.  
Foreign direct investments (FDI) can provide a valuable vehicle in helping to realise 
global technology transfer. Chapter 2 outlines how a virtuous circle can be set up. What 
is needed, on the one hand, is a fundamental reform of investment support policies on 
the side of the investing countries (typically, but not exclusively, “the North”). On the 
other hand, an adequate enabling environment and investment governance polices need 
to be established on the side of recipient countries (typically “the South”). In order to 
advance sustainable technology transfer for a greening of the economy, this paper takes 
a closer look at both sides.  
As a starting point, in chapter 3, the paper investigates the conceptual framework for 
sustainable technology transfer, namely how climate-friendly technologies can best be 
transferred, and what barriers to technology transfer currently exist. 
Given that FDI so far has not always performed well as regards sustainability and 
fairness, chapter 4 reviews past experiences with foreign direct investments. Current 
market framework conditions as well as existing national, bilateral, and multilateral 
policies for the governance of international investments are reflected on to assess their 
adequacy for sustainable technology transfer. Some suggestions are made for how bi- 
and multilateral investment treaties can be enhanced to allow for countries to better 
govern foreign direct investment.  
Chapters 5 and 6 then discuss in greater detail policies and measures in the North and 
South to boost sustainable technology transfer. On the side of recipient countries of 
foreign investments, chapter 5 suggests various policies that could create enabling 
environments to attract sustainable FDI, and ensure that these investments serve both 
to enhance climate protection and economic diversification. Proposals are made, among 
others, on how governments can build effective science and technology infrastructures 
that involve local governments and community institutions in public spending activities 
for research and development. Comprehensive technology needs-assessments are 
necessary to inform decision-makers about future technology options and to help select 
the strategies most appropriate to the country, while specific technology roadmaps can 
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then draw future pathways in terms of specific capabilities, locations, and timelines. 
Moreover, policies that combine fiscal and regulatory measures by lowering costs and 
stimulating demand – ranging from carbon taxes through to codes, standards, and the 
removal of counterproductive subsidies to introducing feed-in tariffs – can steer 
investments in desired directions. Furthermore, governments can better engage the 
banking sector, for example by demanding that banks and other lending institutions 
finance environmentally sound technologies and projects, or by establishing public 
“green development banks”. Finally, bilateral or multilateral collaboration between 
countries and companies could be strengthened through various pilot projects by 
boosting the Climate Technology Initiative, or by establishing Regional Technology 
Synergy Centres.  
On the side of investor countries, chapter 6 critically reviews current export support 
schemes in industrialised countries, namely export credit agencies (ECAs). However, 
multiple reasons discussed in this chapter suggest that it is difficult to reform ECAs so 
that they serve the public interest for climate protection and sustainable development in 
the recipient countries. This paper, therefore, suggests establishing new regional or 
national agencies for supporting fair and sustainable technology transfer. Such 
institutions should be established in accordance with institutional arrangements and 
requirements currently being negotiated under the issue of “technology development and 
transfer” within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). To make a concrete proposal for one region, this paper offers details about 
the suggestion for a European Agency for Low-Carbon Technology Transfer. Specific 
EU climate bonds, issued under the sovereign guarantee of Member States, would be 
accessible for institutional investors, governments, as well as for citizens at the retail 
level. The agency can lend to public and private entities, while it can concede 
guarantees and insurances against commercial and political risks associated with 
specific investments. While primarily supporting small-scale projects benefiting local 
communities, individual large-scale investments and projects should be eligible under a 
selected and limited list of technologies to be regularly reviewed and updated by the 
board of the agency. A fair and transparent dispute resolution mechanism between the 
host country and the agency board could settle eventual disagreements and facilitate 
conciliation, including third parties’ involvement. At the same time, the European 
Ombudsman, elected by the European Parliament, could be tasked to ensure 
transparent, independent, easily accessible, and effective accountability mechanisms for 
directly affected communities. 
If the creation of attractive enabling environments in the global South goes hand in hand 
with new ways of careful export support in the global North, this will work as a global and 
fair Green New Deal. In the end, all sides will significantly benefit: anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases can be reduced, while at the same time increased global cooperation 
will help foster sustainable development in the South and a greening of the economy in 
the North. 
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1. Introduction: Stepping Up Global Cooperation 
The world is facing two major challenges that are closely related to energy. On the one 
hand, atmospheric CO2 concentrations need to be stabilised at a level that avoids 
catastrophic climate change. On the other hand, access to affordable, reliable, and clean 
energy is required to alleviate poverty and ensure decent living standards, in particular 
for the 1.5 billion people of the developing world in rural areas without connection to the 
power grid. In order to answer both challenges at the same time, current fossil-based 
energy systems need to be replaced by sustainable and low-carbon energy supplies. 
Renewable energy sources, together with complementary efforts to save energy, can 
play a key role in simultaneously addressing the challenges of global warming and 
energy access for a growing world population. Similarly rethinking energy production, 
distribution and use could allow a deeper transformation of our societies for promoting a 
more democratic approach to managing the commons.  
To succeed with such a “sustainable and fair energy transition”, it is essential to 
understand the significance of the task (WBGU 2011). Energy is a key driver of 
economic growth and social progress. It is “essential to fueling industry, powering 
infrastructure, connecting goods, people and services to markets, and delivering basic 
services such as heating, lighting and cooking” (WBCSD 2010). For the billions of 
people without access to modern energy services to help them escape poverty and 
establish new productive economic activities, investments in energy infrastructure (on- 
and off-grid) are indispensable (see Box 1). However, it is central that these new 
investments promote energy infrastructures to empower local communities and their 
ways of organising society and political relations around public interests (Hildyard et al. 
2012). 
 
Box 1: Energy poverty and development: Facts and trends  
 
• Today, the one billion people (16% of the global population) living in developed regions 
consume half of the world’s energy supply. In contrast, one billion of the world’s poorest 
people use 4 per cent.  
• Roughly 1.6 billion people worldwide live without electricity.  
• In sub-Saharan Africa, 547 million people have no modern energy services, and as few as 
8 per cent of those living in rural areas have access to any electricity.  
• Around 2.4 billion people still rely on traditional biomass (wood, straw, dung, etc.) to cover 
their basic energy needs. In many developing countries, biomass accounts for more than 
90 per cent of household energy use. The burning of biomass in simple stoves results in 
indoor air pollution, causing 1.3 million deaths per year, primarily among young children 
and mothers. 
• By alleviating this “global energy divide”, the demand for primary energy is projected to 
increase globally by a factor of 1.6 to 3.5 between now and 2050, and in developing 
countries by a factor of 2.3 to 5.2. 
 




As the energy demand of developing countries grows, the developing countries’ share of 
greenhouse gas emissions is also expected to rise, from 39 per cent today to 52 per 
cent by 2030 – with China being responsible for 29 per cent of the predicted rise. India is 
already the fifth biggest emitter of CO2 emissions, yet approximately 45 per cent of its 
population does not have access to electricity, and approximately 85 per cent of the 
population lives on less than $2 per day (UNDP 2006). Clean energy could possibly help 
satisfy the growing energy demands of developing countries, including their growing 
challenge to produce for domestic consumption as well as export to industrialised 
countries while cutting carbon emissions. 
Climate change is expected to have many negative impacts, particularly in vulnerable 
developing countries. Reducing carbon emissions contributes to preventing the long-
term economic, social, and environmental damages and costs of climate change and 
helps to accomplish the targets for greenhouse gas emission reductions as set by the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
Rising oil prices and dependence on energy imports from fewer and fewer oil-exporting 
countries have increased the demand for alternative energy paths. With rising oil prices, 
the competitiveness of renewable energies will further improve. At the same time, higher 
oil prices – due also to financial speculation on oil markets – have created vast 
incentives for the development of non-conventional fossil fuel sources, including tar 
sands, offshore oil explorations, as well as shale gas. Particularly dependent (and thus 
vulnerable) are developing countries, whose oil supplies largely rely on imports. 
Furthermore, even some oil-producing countries have problems in accessing oil 
products, given their very limited refinery capacities, such as in the case of Nigeria. 
Scaling-up production of renewable energies would significantly reduce oil imports and 
diversify the energy sources. Renewable domestic energy sources offer great 
development perspectives to structurally weak rural areas. A UN study (UNEP 2009) on 
the potential of green jobs found that renewable energy generates more jobs than 
employment in fossil fuels. Projected investments of $630 billion by 2030 would translate 
into at least 20 million additional jobs in the renewable energy sector. 
At the same time, it is essential to establish renewable energy sources in a sustainable, 
democratic, and development-friendly manner. While renewable energies are highlighted 
as having the least negative impact on climate change, greenhouse gas savings can 
vary significantly for the specific production and conversion paths and their inputs. There 
is an ongoing debate about the carbon balance of biofuels and their impact on land use 
and food security in developing countries (Scheffran and Summerfield 2009). 
Furthermore, large dams have had outstanding and extensive social and environmental 
impacts – as well as some impacts on climate change – to the point that many do not 
regard them as sustainable renewable energy sources (World Commission on Dams 
2000). In some cases, large-scale wind farms built on cleared land that had previously 
belonged to local communities generated social conflicts. If not addressed properly, 
these and other concerns about possible adverse implications of renewable energies 
may undercut their support, demanding that renewable energy production and 
consumption is established in a manner that facilitates sustainable development in the 
South (Hazell and von Braun 2006). 
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From a broader economic perspective, renewable industry expansion should be put in 
the context of the current economic and financial crisis. Several observers raised 
concerns about a possible next “green bubble” due to highly speculative investments 
artificially inflating the renewable sector, biofuel expansion (Laughlin 2011) and carbon 
markets (Friends of the Earth 2009), in particular in emerging economies.1  
Towards a sustainable and fair energy transition 
Stabilising the atmospheric CO2 concentrations at non-dangerous levels will require – 
among other transformative actions of our societies – a rapid increase in the scale and 
speed of low-carbon innovation and technology. For instance, to achieve a 450-ppm 
scenario by 2050, global emissions need to be reduced by 50 Gt CO2 compared to 2005 
(IEA 2006). With an increase in energy demand in non-OECD countries, a major 
challenge is to accelerate the diffusion of low-carbon technologies to developing 
countries (WBCSD 2010).  
In both developing and developed countries, there is a significant growth potential of 
innovative technologies for heating, electricity generation, and transportation fuels. 
There has been a dramatic shift in policy support in many parts of the world in recent 
years; the growing demands and rising levels of subsidies for renewable energies have 
broadened the economic basis of this policy support. This is expected to lead to a large 
expansion of sustainable energy and energy-efficiency technologies over the next 
decade and beyond, in particular if current subsidies for fossil fuel technologies are 
phased out soon. 
Beyond the innovation of technologies, the improved dissemination and broad 
application of these technologies must occur fast enough to prevent global climate 
disaster. Since fossil-based technology is part of the problem, a radical change in 
technology use is needed that is environmentally sound, sustainable, and low-carbon. 
To achieve this, innovations are necessary in the social and political realms. The global 
climate policy debate is no longer about whether to take action but about how, when, 
and where to act; which actions need to be taken; and by whom. While the struggle 
against global climate change ranks high on global political agendas, policy-makers are 
struggling to find and agree upon the best policy frameworks. Various conflicting issues 
need to be bridged and integrated in the future: science and society, economics and the 
environment, international and domestic policies, global and local governance, public 
and private spheres, governments and civil society, North and South. Overcoming these 
differences requires a level of coordination and cooperation unprecedented in history as 
well as a strong political will to overcome entrenched interests to maintain the status 
quo. 
Managing the sustainable energy transition requires tremendous financial resources, 
and there have been considerable changes in recent years. Countries all over the world 
– from China and India to Germany and the United States – are spending considerable 
                                                      
1 This was the case with recent significant investments into emerging renewable companies in India by 
private equity infrastructure funds; their values were artificially inflated for purely speculative reasons 
during the IPO listing process. 
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amounts of money to transform the energy bases of their economies. Since 2000 there 
has been significant growth in new investment in sustainable energy, with annual growth 
rates exceeding 50 per cent (see Figure 1). In 2008, the record of $173 billion was 
reached, followed by a 7 per cent reduction to $162 billion in 2009, largely in response to 
the economic recession. However, major economies began to spend some of the 
estimated $188 billion in “green stimulus” policies, including for renewable energy. 
According to REN21’s Renewables 2010 Global Status Report, more than 100 countries 
had some type of policy target or promotion policy for renewable energy by early 2010 
(Bloomberg 2010).  
However, while scaling-up investment and financial resources in low-carbon technology 
is important, it does not suffice to generate real change in energy patterns if it is not 
coupled with the definition of an innovative framework of public interest policies guiding a 
sustainable and just energy transition, including the regulation of foreign direct 
investment and international financial and export flows at large.  
Figure 1: Global investment in sustainable energy from 2004 to 2009 (bn $)  
 
Source: Bloomberg (2010) 
 
 
Many countries have already started to foster an increased global cooperation on 
climate-friendly investments, for example, through foreign direct investment (FDI). Low-
carbon FDI is estimated to have already reached a significant level, with flows of roughly 
$90 billion in 2009 in three key industries alone: (a) alternative/renewable electricity 
generation; (b) recycling; and (c) manufacturing of environmental technology products 
(such as wind turbines, solar panels, and biofuels). Yet according to the World 
Development Report, only around 40 per cent of identifiable low-carbon FDI projects – 
measured by value – during the 2003–2009 period were in developing countries, 
including projects in Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Turkey, the United Republic of 
Tanzania, and Viet Nam. Transnational corporations from industrial countries are major 
investors, but about 10 per cent of identifiable low-carbon FDI projects from 2003 to 
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2009 were generated by corporations from developing and transition economies, with 
the majority of their investments in other developing countries (WIR 2010). 
Even though low-carbon technology investments have been steadily rising, the global 
scale of the challenge in reducing greenhouse gas emissions requires a much larger 
financial and technological response. For the 2010–2015 period, one estimate indicates 
that $440 billion of recurring additional global investments per year are required to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions to the level needed for a 2ºC target to be met. The estimates 
up until 2030 range even higher: up to $1.2 trillion per year.  
Estimates of the financing resources currently available are classified in a UNFCCC 
report (2009) by the maturity stage of the technology that they are intended for, whether 
the resources are from the public or private sector, and whether they are under or 
outside the Convention. The estimates for mitigation technologies, shown in Figure 2, 
are between $70 and 165 billion per year. For technologies for adaptation, the research 
and development is focussed on tailoring the technology to the specific site and 
application; it therefore forms part of the project cost. Current spending on adaptation 
projects in developing countries is about $1 billion per year.  
Figure 2: Estimates of current financing for mitigation technologies  
 
Source: UNFCCC (2009) 
 
Given the sheer magnitude of finances needed, it is clear that public financing, as 
currently conceived and operated, is not sufficient to address the problem. Current fiscal 
constrains, in particular in European countries, further limit the scope of action for 
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climate financing by public financial institutions. Thus, many observers and policy-
makers have voiced the need to involve the private sector. Indeed, several studies 
emphasise that the financial contribution of the private sector is essential for achieving 
progress in making economies worldwide more climate-friendly, particularly in view of 
the huge public fiscal deficits worldwide.  
Public initiatives are essential to leverage private capital and to channel it into the most 
climate-friendly direction. However, since businesses can be seen as both part of the 
problem and part of the solution, climate change policies need to encourage business to 
make more constructive contributions. The challenge is how public policies can drive the 
transformation of private investment and financial markets by setting rules and 
incentivising priorities for these – and possibly reducing speculative attitudes – to make 
these flows compatible with public interest action. 
 
Box 2: Patterns of financing  
 
(a) The financing resources for technologies for mitigation and adaptation make up only a 
small share (probably less than 3.5%) of the resources devoted globally to all technology 
development and transfer. 
(b) Most of the financing resources (probably over 60%) for the development and transfer of 
climate technologies are provided by businesses. 
(c) Most of the remaining resources (about 35% of the total) are provided by national 
governments. 
(d) Technology development is concentrated (about 90%) in a few countries/regions – the 
United States of America, the European Union, Japan and China. 
(e) Although R&D is becoming more international, there is no international funding 
mechanism and limited coordination for such activities. 
(f) Only about 10–20 per cent of these resources are used for the development and transfer 
of technologies to developing countries. 
(g) Current financing resources need to be increased significantly, including tighter capital 
controls, which could mobilise existing domestic resources and channel these – as well as 
some external resources – into sustainable and productive activities.  
Source: UNFCCC (2009) 
 
Estimates of financing needs  
 
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that developing countries will need 
annual electricity supply investments of approximately $165 billion through 2010, 
increasing at about 3 per cent a year through to 2030.  
 About half of the necessary financing is readily identifiable, leaving an investment gap in 
the energy sector of about $80 billion per year. The IEA estimates that international 
financial institutions, aid donors, and the private sector can close this gap by approximately 
$11 billion per year through additional investments using existing financial instruments. 
 In its 2007 analysis of financial flows, the UNFCCC estimates that $200–210 billion will 
be necessary up until 2030 to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions at today’s levels. The 
incremental costs of low-carbon investments in developing countries are likely to be at least 
$20–30 billion per year. 
 Today, private sector investments constitute the largest share (86%) of global 
investment flows and are expected to be essential to addressing climate change. Large 
additional flows of tens of billions of dollars will also be needed for adaptation. 
 
Source: WBCSD (2010) 
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2. Export Support and Investment Governance for Climate 
Protection 
There are few strong producers and exporters of climate-friendly technologies among 
the developing countries. A worldwide energy transition and sustainable economic 
transformation will only succeed if the economic and technological capacities of all 
countries are involved. To govern the transition, therefore, the main task is to 
significantly scale-up production capacities for clean and energy-efficient technologies all 
over the world, in particular in the global South. Know-how from forerunner countries and 
companies needs to be tapped and made available for worldwide application and 
continuous improvement. 
In principle, by complementing the mobilisation of domestic resources, foreign direct 
investments could be a valuable vehicle to advance the transfer of know-how and 
production capacities for low-carbon technologies into countries that still need to develop 
this sector. Yet despite the existence of bilateral and regional investment agreements, 
which guarantee investors’ rights, only a few developing countries currently enjoy 
significant foreign investment inflows. The majority of the world is by and large 
marginalised from foreign investment flows. The reasons for the lack of foreign 
investment inflows are diverse, including lack of domestic financing, demand, and 
market size; inefficient and untransparent bureaucracies; lack of investment stability; 
corruption and bad governance; and more. At the same time, foreign investors 
sometimes try to obtain better financial and fiscal conditions, exemptions from local laws, 
or broader reductions in performance requirements for their FDIs as a condition to 
operate in certain countries, thus creating dubious environmental, social, and 
development impacts. In effect, simple liberalisation of investment conditions has not 
helped in overcoming the barriers; in fact, it has sometimes worsened the environmental 
and social soundness of foreign investments.  
A virtuous circle for sustainable technology transfer  
International cooperation can help in overcoming several of these barriers and problems. 
On the one hand, more regulations and standards are needed to ensure that foreign 
investments work for climate protection and sustainable development. On the other 
hand, public money could serve as a mean to overcome limited demand or market size 
and to reduce forerunner companies’ financial risks when investing abroad. This is the 
carrot and the stick: to unleash private capital for foreign low-carbon investments 
through public support while governing these investments to maximise their mitigation 
and sustainable development potential on the ground.  
In order to realise such a virtuous circle, industrialised countries must raise – and make 
use of – public money to support and channel foreign investments into climate-friendly 
operations. In particular, support should be offered to companies, for example renewable 
energy companies, that aim to invest in countries with low production capacities and 
under certain environmental, social, and development conditions. The level of support 
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should significantly raise companies’ interests to go abroad. At the same time, countries 
should support only those investments that conform to the highest standards at home.  
For example, countries can insure investments against financial and market instabilities; 
pay investment premiums to incentivise investments into markets with limited demand; 
provide loans with low interest rates to make investments attractive, even where returns 
on investments are expected to be low; and the like. In some cases, governments may 
build on existing national (or regional) mechanisms and institutions that already promote 
foreign investments. However, as this paper shows in great detail after having taken a 
closer look at the current state of export credit agencies, several challenges remain. 
Most industrialised countries will have to both radically reform their export support 
schemes to make them work for climate protection and sustainable development, as well 
as scale them up to increase the pace of international collaboration. 
Those countries receiving foreign investments, that is, countries of the global South, 
must progressively govern foreign investment inflows (see also UNEP 2011, 553). 
Strong, stable, transparent, coherent, credible, and ambitious long-term investment 
policies are key to effectively governing foreign investment inflows and making them not 
only work for climate protection but for the larger social, economic, and environmental 
goals. For example, investment policies can channel foreign capital to climate-friendly 
sectors; require domestic/local companies to hold significant ownership stakes in joint 
ventures; demand that foreign investors purchase locally wherever possible; mandate 
foreign investors to offer additional capacity-building programmes and training of 
domestic personnel; and the like.  
National investment policies should be designed in such a way so as to maximise 
mitigation potentials as well as economic diversification and development. They can be 
guided effectively by technology roadmaps and should help countries to implement their 
nationally appropriate mitigation actions. At the same time, investment inflows will create 
a multiplying effect in Southern economies as a whole, thus triggering further economic 
activities in adjacent sectors, services, local suppliers, and retailers while leapfrogging 
into a low-carbon future. 
Finally, from a broader macroeconomic perspective, careful management of developing 
countries’ balance of payment is needed for the planning and governing of foreign direct 
investments in order to reduce external shocks due to financial crises and sudden 
withdrawals of investments as well as to avoid harmful imbalances, which could make 
countries’ FDIs dependant and heavily indebted in the long run (Woodward 2001). 
Reducing risks and sharing benefits 
Although the North and South have different responsibilities and capacities, such a 
smartly designed transformation can reduce the risks and bring benefits to both. While 
developed countries are expected to take on the incremental costs of low-carbon 
investments in the global South – and thus to be the main source of the financing 
needed for the transition – this may become an opportunity rather than a burden for 
them. Increased foreign investments into environmentally sound technologies will 
diversify the portfolios of domestic companies, link them to international markets, create 
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new jobs, and generate returns on investments. In times when the potential for economic 
growth in industrialised countries continues to shrink, supporting domestic companies to 
engage abroad and help other countries build up their own local energy industries, could 
enable a “soft landing” for economies in the North when entering the age of 
sustainability.  
At the same time, financial transfers can create social and economic benefits for the 
countries in the global South, in particular for rural and urban communities. Benefits first 
and foremost include employment opportunities, reduction of poverty, and access to 
advanced technologies. Investments can strengthen domestic markets and develop 
future export markets, leading to economic diversification. Furthermore, investments 
may translate into infrastructure development, contribute to rises in local GDP, and result 
in a reduced share of GDP spent on energy imports, either through energy efficiency or 
the use of local renewable sources (WBCSD 2010). Protecting the environment and 
preserving natural resources can provide additional social, environmental, and economic 
benefits, while also reducing the vulnerability to climate change impacts. Although many 
developing countries are not major greenhouse gas emitters, new technology 
investments would help them to enter low-emission pathways and avoid the dirty 
development paths that industrialised countries have been pursuing.  
The sustainable energy transition is significant for the public sector, which in the past 
has been a main source of the political and societal interventions driving technology 
development and transfer, such as through direct governmental expenditures, research, 
regulations, and policies. Renewable energy systems receive a high level of public 
support, which is justified by the expected energy, economic, and environmental benefits 
of renewable energies, including a number of co-benefits, such as: sectoral effects of 
rural electrification; energy security through energy diversification and improved 
efficiency; local environment benefits; and international funding opportunities.  
From a business perspective, there might also be major advantages for the private 
sector to pursue climate change mitigation and the transfer of low-carbon technologies. 
Beyond some returns, companies involved in the transfer process are likely to help 
improve production processes, including enhancing their energy-, material-, and 
resource-efficiency. Early adopters profit from strengthened productive capacities and 
enhanced competitiveness. Driving this process would accelerate a developing 
countries’ transition and facilitate leapfrogging into a green economy, assuming that 
there will be an increased demand as well as new export and domestic opportunities for 
low-carbon products and services. On the demand side, a growing pool of responsible 
consumers and the rise of a sustainability-oriented civil society shaping consumer 
preferences will help to establish such a market (UNCTAD 2010.  
However, a key question remains about which type of private sector (large 
multinationals, listed companies with high reliance on capital markets, small and medium 
enterprises, cooperatives, other non-profit actors, private companies with public equity, 
local municipalities’ companies, and so on) is best suited for promoting a socially just, 
long-term, economically sustainable green economy. In particular, identifying new 
mechanisms and regulations for technology transfer at the global level should include 
reflections on how to become more responsive in moving towards a more localised, 
community accountable, and democratic green economy. 
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3. A Conceptual Framework for Technology Transfer 
The importance of technology transfer was realised in the agreements achieved at the 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (chapter 34). Likewise, Article 
4.5 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change requests: “The developed 
country Parties … shall take all practical steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as 
appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-
how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to 
implement the provisions of the Convention. In this process, the developed country 
Parties shall support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and 
technologies of developing country Parties. Other Parties and organisations in a position 
to do so may also assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies.” 
The promise of access to new technologies was a central incentive for developing 
nations to support the UNFCCC in 1992 but success has been widely questioned and 
many developing nations feel frustrated about the lack of technology transfer in practice 
(Feldman 1992; Foray 2008). The importance of technology transfer was also 
recognised in Article 10c of the Kyoto Protocol. Furthermore, this treaty has created 
mechanisms to reduce emissions, including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
which is focussed on low-carbon technology transfer to developing countries. Although 
the CDM (as well as Joint Implementation) was expected to generate foreign investment 
and technology flows, this expectation has largely not been met. Because the Protocol’s 
mechanisms were designed for compliance with emission-reduction targets of 
industrialised countries, this created little incentive to maximise the transfer of 
technology to developing countries. Furthermore, the questionable implementation of the 
principles of environmental and financial additionality for CDM projects has rewarded 
dubious – and in some case environmentally and socially harmful – projects 
(CarbonTradeWatch 2011). 
In a different context, at Gleneagles in July 2005, the G8 highlighted the importance of 
strengthening technology cooperation to develop low-carbon energy options; yet what 
followed were only some bilateral actions (Mallett et al. 2009). The issue of “technology 
transfer and development” also figures high in current climate negotiations within the 
framework of the Bali Action Plan. The climate conference in Cancun (COP 16) in 
December 2010 suggested a number of concrete measures for technology transfer and 
investment, offering various opportunities for collaboration between public and private 
sectors. Yet these negotiations have not been concluded, and thus, uncertainties about 
the post-Kyoto framework weaken the private sector’s ability and willingness to make 
decisions in the area of climate change.  
In essence, therefore, the current international climate regime lacks what the private 
sector needs most: a strong international and national commitment by governments and 
a clear, stable, and predictable policy framework (see also WBCSD 2010). Recent 
climate summits in Cancun and Durban showed that governments are not willing to 
agree on a comprehensive international policy framework to prevent runaway climate 
change, so alternative routes need to be explored before it is too late. The current  
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international climate change regime so far has not strongly encouraged low-carbon 
foreign investment and related technology flows, particularly into developing economies. 
It has become clear that there is a dire need for creative mechanisms – both at national 
and international levels – to effectively mobilise the private sector’s contributions to 
cross-border capital flows and technology diffusions, especially to the global South. 
What is sustainable technology transfer? 
Technology transfer is widely seen as the main instrument to bridge the technology gap 
between North and South and, increasingly, between a few high-growth and many 
poorer developing countries. There is a range of literature on the process of technology 
transfer that covers various issues of innovation, development, behavioural change, and 
economic development (see the overviews in IPCC 2000 and Karakosta et al. 2010), 
although there are no overarching theories. In the following, we outline a few points that 
should be remembered when analysing the innovation, transfer, and diffusion of low-
carbon technologies. This is followed by a section that identifies important barriers and 
obstacles to technology transfer.  
Technology transfer reaches beyond the trade of “end products” and can include the 
entire lifecycle of a given technology, including research and development, design, 
testing, assembling, building, production, maintenance, transport, utilisation, dismantling, 
and waste management. Since the ultimate goal is to facilitate technology development 
in other parts of the world, the trade of “end products” can rather be seen as an auxiliary 
function of technology transfer at the beginning of the process. More important, however, 
is that the necessary enabling environment and infrastructure needs to be created so 
that as many stages of the technology lifecycle as possible can be accomplished 
domestically. Moreover, technologies often need to be adapted to local needs and 
conditions. Ultimately, technology transfer will involve three separate technology flows: 
a) physical goods and equipment, b) skills and know-how for operating and maintaining 
equipment, and c) knowledge and expertise for generating and managing technological 
change. It is not sufficient to only transfer technology goods without also the knowledge 
of how to (re-)produce them and the skills of how to use and maintain them.  
Note that technology transfer is embedded into societal structures, and it transforms 
them at the same time. In order to be produced, used, and maintained, a technical 
system requires resources and infrastructures for its operation as well as human and 
social capital that rests on the working capacity of people who maintain and operate it, 
as well as on their knowledge, skills, expertise, and communication. Some gaps can be 
closed domestically by building the capacity needed; other gaps have to be acquired 
internationally, provided they can be relocated. This may be feasible for individual 
components (such as mechanical tools or vehicles) but it is more difficult for whole 
network systems (such as power grids or transport systems). A particular challenge is to 
organise the transfer of human capital, assuming that human beings may only 
temporarily want to relocate, and in limited numbers.  
Throughout the process of technology transfer, various stakeholders are involved, such 
as governments, private-sector entities, financial institutions, NGOs, and 
research/education institutions. In addition, stakeholders in North-South transfers 
include, inter alia, project developers, technology owners, technology suppliers, product 
  17
buyers, recipients, users of the technology, financiers and donors, governments, 
international organisations, NGOs, and community groups (IPCC 2000). To overcome 
the various barriers to technology transfer, the interests and influences of all different 
stakeholders need to be considered and incorporated, for example, through stakeholder 
dialogues.  
How does the actual transfer of technologies take place? Three different “pathways” can 
be distinguished (Karakosta et al. 2010): government-driven pathways of technology 
transfer, which are initiated by governments to fulfil specific policy objectives; private-
sector-driven pathways, which primarily involve transfers between commercially oriented 
private-sector entities; and community-driven pathways, which involve community 
organisations with a high degree of collective decision-making. No doubt, private-sector-
driven pathways have become the dominant mode of technology transfer. More 
specifically, technology transfer is often driven by transnational corporations that are 
seeking to expand their markets. However, during the last years, technology transfer has 
been increasingly organised by multilateral organisations and NGOs that are concerned 
with promoting technology transfer to support development in a more sustainable and 
equitable manner. Table 1 illustrates the importance of the different types of financing to 
various transfer routes. The main focus of this study is on government-driven pathways. 
Table 1: The relative importance of particular types of financial flows to 
technology transfer pathways  
 






 Cross-border movement of personnel   –   +++   –  
 Foreign direct investment   +   +++   –  
 Foreign portfolio equity investment   +   ++   +  
 Government assistance programmes   +++   –   ++  
 Joint ventures   +   +++   –  
 Licensing   ++   +++   –  
 Loans   ++   +++   –  
 Meetings, workshops, conferences, and other public 
forums  
 +   –   +++  
 NGOs   +   –   +++  
 Open literature (journals, magazines, books, and 
articles)  
 +   +   +++  
 Trades in goods and services (includes purchases, 
sales, exports and imports)  
 +   +++   –  
 (+) Minor; (++) secondary; (+++) primary component of pathway 
Source: Karakosta et al. (2010) 
In order to go beyond the narrow scope of technology transfer, which seeks to support 
access to specific technologies, the diffusion of new innovations will require a broad 
approach to capacity-building to enable developing countries to generate their own 
innovation systems. Recent research suggests that large increases in low-carbon 
diffusion rates can be achieved through an emphasis on system-wide capacity-building 
to improve internal innovation and absorption systems. It is important that countries 
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move beyond a narrow national competitiveness to capture the global public-good 
aspects of low-carbon innovation.  
To build effective innovation systems in developing countries, international collaboration 
will be vital to achieve the necessary commercial scale for low-carbon technologies 
(Tomlinson et al. 2008). International technology dissemination entails the acquisition, 
mastery, diffusion, and “indigenisation” of knowledge, technology, and skills in a host 
country, all of which are not only transferred across borders, but also absorbed by local 
actors. In this context, “acquisition” means movement of the technology to local players; 
and “mastery” requires that local actors are fully capable of using the knowledge and 
building on it (i.e. they have the “absorptive capacity” to do this). Indigenisation of 
technology is a long-term concept, implying that the technology has become part of the 
national knowledge and innovation system – including the diffusion to other enterprises 
and the further research, development, and innovation in the host country (WIR 2010).  
Addressing barriers and obstacles to technology transfer  
To develop and utilise the huge potential for low-carbon technologies in the developing 
world, a number of barriers and obstacles that limit their availability and applicability 
need to be overcome. Barriers arise at each stage of the technology transfer and 
investment process, including infrastructure and ownership, cost and financing, 
regulatory and policy barriers, and other factors that vary across countries. 
Lack of capacity-building and domestic infrastructure  
A key barrier to technology transfer is the South’s lack of domestic infrastructure and 
absorptive capacity, which is more significant at early stages of development than for 
technologies in the later stages of commercialisation. Since capacity-building is neither 
easy nor quick, attempts at capacity-building have a long history of failure (UNDP and 
HIID 1996). Previous development assistance projects (e.g. small-scale renewable-
energy technologies in the 1970s and 1980s), often were considered failures because of 
poor technical performance and lack of replication of the original projects as well as lack 
of attention to user needs and local conditions. Despite the emphasis on capacity-
building and a few success stories (e.g. Solar Home Systems in Kenya and 
Bangladesh), the record of capacity-building in practice so far has been mixed. There is 
a great deal of uncertainty about precisely what capacities are needed and how they are 
developed (IPCC 2000). Without investment in capacity-building, the skills qualifications 
in developing countries will remain at a lower level compared with industrialised 
countries. 
Macro-economic conditions and market failure 
In many countries in the South, the macroeconomic conditions are poorly developed, in 
particular in the financial sector. Key factors that increase investment risk are high or 
uncertain levels of inflation and interest rates, high import duties, and often changing tax 
or tariff policies. Due to low prices and subsidies for conventional energy, there are 
negative incentives to adopt energy-saving measures and renewable energy 
technologies. Often proper market conditions are missing, for example a lack of 
manufacturers and consumer acceptance, or diminishing confidence in economic, 
commercial, and technical viability of low-carbon products and technologies. As a result, 
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market demand is concentrated in high-income and transition economies with large 
industrial population centres and existing power transmission infrastructure.  
Lock-in due to lack of information, innovation, and diffusion 
Many developing countries have only limited experience in green technologies and lack 
the strong knowledge base, integrated physical infrastructure, financial resources, and 
institutional capabilities needed. Innovation- and invention capacity are overwhelmingly 
concentrated in high-income countries and are missing in many developing countries, 
thus limiting their ability to engage in effective decarbonisation and adaptation 
(Tomlinson et al. 2008). Even in China as one of the leading countries in technology 
production in the global South, more than 85 per cent of the patents in China’s core 
high-tech economic sector are owned by companies in developed countries (Liu 2007). 
Since most low-carbon technologies are new or under development, it is costly to 
acquire and use them, limiting their diffusion rate and penetration (World Bank 2008, 
68).  
Deficits in research and development spending policy 
More than 80 per cent of global research and development is conducted in just 10 
countries. Most of it is directly undertaken by transnational corporations, including the 
technologies required for climate change mitigation (National Science Board 2010). 
Despite some recent increases, public spending in energy-related R&D over the last 25 
years has fallen by up to 50 per cent in real terms in major developed countries (IEA 
2008). During the past 15 years, only 7.7 per cent of R&D budgets in IEA member 
countries was devoted to renewable energy technologies. Solar heating and cooling 
represents only 0.55 per cent, and solar PV only 2.68 per cent (Karakosta et al. 2010). 
Wind power, geothermal energy, and concentrated solar power receive even less 
money, which suggests that public R&D funding is somehow inversely proportional to 
the energy potential (IEA 2006).  
Experts unanimously agree that the amount of R&D funding for low-carbon energy 
technologies needs to be increased tremendously. For instance, the Stern report has 
called for a doubling of R&D funding, and a much larger increase in deployment funding 
(Stern 2006).  
Intellectual property rights  
The adequate governance of intellectual property rights (IPRs) is a major requirement for 
successful technology transfer and investment. Insufficient IPR protection can deter 
international firms from transferring technologies, while strict protection of IPRs by 
supplier firms can prevent recipient firms from gaining access to the knowledge 
necessary to imitate, and then innovate, on the basis of new technologies, creating 
barriers to easy dissemination. Patenting rates in carbon emissions technologies have 
risen by 20 per cent per year since 1997 – a faster increase than in traditional energy 
technologies. It is worth noting that governments financed much of the basic research 
undertaken at universities and public research laboratories, and the majority of the 
financing has come from a relatively small number of countries. There has been a 
marked expansion of patent applications in developing countries, leading to a five-fold 
increase in applications in the last four years of the period studied. However, all 
expansion occurred in a small group of emerging economies. For instance, China is a 
significant source of new environmental technologies and holds a significant share of 
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global patents in solar energy and fuel cells. Other emerging economies are important 
sources for other technologies, for instance Mexico in hydro/marine technologies and 
India in solar PV technologies. Therefore, the issue of low-carbon technology transfer 
and patents increasingly needs to be discussed not only from a North-South perspective, 
but also a South-South perspective. Failure to address the proprietary and 
appropriability issues related to IPR can severely inhibit the development of 
technological capacities within countries that still need to build up their own domestic 
innovation capacities.  
Financial and political obstacles for foreign investment  
Only a few developing countries currently enjoy the economic and political conditions for 
significant foreign investment inflows. Among the economic factors are the lack of viable 
market structures, domestic financing, and investment stability. Inappropriate 
characteristics of the banking system – such as inadequate banking regulations, 
supervision, and oversight – can adversely affect long-term investment, the import of 
capital goods, and technology transfer. Simple liberalisation of investment conditions has 
not worked to overcome the barriers; sometimes it even worsened the environmental 
and social conditions for foreign investments. With their nascent regulatory and 
institutional structures, their small markets, and their emerging indigenous firms, 
developing countries are particularly vulnerable to transnational corporations and their 
potential for anti-competitive practices (WIR 2010). Equipped with cutting-edge 
technology and the capacity to implement more capital-intensive and efficient production 
processes, transnational corporations may effectively crowd-out domestic companies in 
developing countries, especially those operating at an (overall) lower level of efficiency, 
output, and quality. This can lead to reduced competition in host country markets and 
thereby contribute to the potential for market dominance and restrictive business 
practices. 
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4. Foreign Investments and Sustainable Development 
The impact of foreign direct investment on development in general has been a much 
debated topic. International financial institutions as well as the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and its member states have 
increasingly promoted FDI with the assumption that it creates new jobs, spreads best-
practice social and environmental standards, and stimulates the transfer of technology, 
eventually leading to economic growth. On the other hand, civil society organisations 
and labour unions have documented many negative effects of FDI, such as human rights 
violations, harmful environmental practices, and tax evasion by transnational companies 
in developing countries. Furthermore, volatility in FDI flows have contributed to regional 
and global economic imbalances, which are at the heart of unfolding systemic financial 
and economic crises. 
Lessons learnt from past experiences  
In theory, FDI may positively contribute to sustainable development in several ways. The 
mainstream economic argument in favour of FDI-led development is the existence of 
spillover effects on domestic companies in terms of technology, marketing, and 
management knowledge; movement of employees; and imitation of production (OECD 
2002). But this happens only in some sectors and in some cases – for instance the 
establishment of special export zones prevents spillovers from happening. FDI may also 
augment economic growth, if it contributes positively to the capital and current account 
balance and government revenues. These issues are quite hot at the moment in the G20 
debate on capital controls as part of the policy options for reducing global economic 
imbalances and on transfer mispricing by transnational corporations, which is at the 
heart of tax avoidance via offshore financial centres. 
Conventional FDI has often brought negative social and environmental impacts and has 
not necessarily contributed to significant employment creation in the long-run. In 
particular, transnational corporations have been repeatedly accused of not producing 
positive spillovers, but rather just generating pollution and environmental destruction, 
most severely in extractive industries and the energy sector (Singh 2007).  
In order to attract more FDI, many developing countries have opened their markets by 
conceding better terms, for example through tax cuts and loosened environmental and 
social legislation. In addition, several countries have had to fully liberalise their capital 
accounts under pressure from structural adjustment programmes of the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Yet this has not even contributed to a significant 
increase in FDIs, but rather has reduced host countries’ policy space in the long-run. 
The lack of capital controls has contributed – together with trade and investment 
liberalisation – to the generation of global and regional imbalances, thereby putting the 
entire global economy at risk. 
As empirical evidence shows, FDI is not an automatic route to economic growth, but in 
many cases and for various reasons, FDI has led to an outflow of capital rather than an 
inflow. In several developing countries, profit remittances are even higher than FDI 
  22
inflows. Not to mention problems related to tax evasion and transfer mispricing by 
foreign investors. Therefore, these issues raise once more the need to identify under 
which conditions FDI can contribute in the long-run to the common good – in terms of 
wealth redistribution, long-lasting development, and climate mitigation and adaptation – 
more than just arguing whether international investment is good or bad in itself (SOMO 
1999). 
Today, a web of about 3,000 bilateral and regional treaties on investment – centred on 
investment liberalisation and biased in favour of investors’ rights – regulate FDIs 
internationally. Policy prescriptions and practices differ from one case to another, 
likewise the mechanisms to redress possible violations of these treaties (IISD 2011). 
Furthermore, each individual operation is ruled by specific project investment treaties, 
with their own sets of rules, clauses, and related mechanisms – often biased in favour of 
protecting investors more than the public interest (Hildyard and Muttit 2006). 
Lately, in particular in the vein of the economic and financial crisis, multilateral and 
national development institutions have turned their attention back towards supporting 
FDIs and portfolio investments as a key engine for economic growth in developing 
countries. This controversial shift, often based on macroeconomic assumptions still 
disputed by the academia and civil society (SOMO 2008), has raised new questions 
about what kind of investments should enjoy public support. For example, pivotal 
question are: Under which conditions can transnational companies be true actors 
fostering sustainable development? Or should public support rather be focussed on local 
economic actors, including new types of indigenous private sector actors? 
To sum up, the overall empirical evidence in the history of FDIs provides mixed results. It 
suggests that spillover effects do not come automatically or “for free”, but instead require 
active government intervention to capture the benefits. A key requirement is a certain 
“absorptive capacity” at the company and country levels. This evidence, coupled with 
similar mixed results regarding social and environmental consequences of FDIs, 
contradicts the national investment promotion policies and the proliferation of trade and 
investment treaties aimed at the liberalisation of FDI that have been promoted by 
international financial institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the OECD 
in the last decades. These arrangements, in fact, have restrained developing-country 
governments from using industrial policies or other regulations that have been 
successfully applied in the past by the Asian Tiger economies and Western countries to 
reap the benefits of foreign investments.  
A key lesson can be learnt from past experiences with FDI in developing countries: 
Sustainable development can only be facilitated by foreign investments when the right 
policies are already in place at the national level, and when host countries still retain the 
right to select foreign investments and benefit from investment revenues in an adequate 
manner by balancing investors’ rules and duties.  
Such a selective and focussed approach – which might imply also a shrinking of some 
FDIs that may not seem appropriate to sustainable development – requires specific 
policy measures, including the following: capital controls as a powerful lever for 
regulating FDI entrance and exit from a country and for contributing towards the 
reduction of dangerous external macroeconomic imbalances; precise policies aimed at 
shaping investment inflows towards the transfer of environmentally sound and climate-
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friendly technologies to developing countries and reducing investments in high-carbon 
sectors, such as extractives; a revision of existing international investment treaties in 
order to regain sufficient domestic policy space for an effective governance of 
investment flows. In this regard, this paper will take a closer look at the various drivers 
and factors that shape international investments treaties, and which policy choices are 
available to reform them. 
Challenges in reforming international investment treaties 
The vast majority of international investment treaties cover investment in general, and 
only a few address investment in specific sectors that are relevant for climate change – 
as, for instance, the Energy Charter Treaty, or the Energy Protocol of the Economic 
Community of West African States. “Investment” is usually defined broadly to include 
both tangible and intangible assets. Agreements therefore not only cover financial flows, 
but also, among others, intellectual property rights. One of the most significant 
provisions in many treaties is the right for investors to have disputes with the host state 
resolved through international arbitration rather than through the host state’s domestic 
courts. The prospect of arbitration has sometimes discouraged governments from 
pursuing regulations in their citizens’ interest – the so-called chilling effect. 
Investment treaties generally bind each contracting state to provide certain standards of 
treatment to investors from the other contracting state (SOMO 2003). Such clauses 
generate a significant bias in favour of the protection of investors’ rights and often do not 
help in establishing a balance between its rights and duties (Seattle to Brussels Network 
2010). In fact, most investment treaties do not consider any specific matters regarding 
environmental and social protection; coherence with other international agreements; and 
the promotion of the global public good. 
At the same time, many treaties include a provision for “defence of necessity”, which 
means that treaties shall not be construed to prevent any contracting party from taking 
any measure that it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security 
interests. This provision can also be referred to under customary international law, 
despite the threshold of qualifying for it being quite high. To date, no investor-to-state 
dispute has ever considered the defence of necessity provision in an environmental 
context. However, given the potential for climate change having far-reaching and serious 
impacts, it would appear possible to argue – at least for more vulnerable countries – that 
climate change jeopardises both their essential security interests and their public order 
(IISD 2010). 
The more gravely and incontrovertibly urgent that the host state’s need is to take 
measures, the more likely it will be found to fulfil the defence of necessity provision 
under both the treaty (if it contains such a clause) and customary international law. Thus, 
“necessity” is probably more likely to succeed as a defence with respect to a measure 
taken under urgency to adapt to the effects of climate change. While the need to mitigate 
climate change is essential, mitigation is required at a global level, and it would be 
difficult for an individual host state to prove that a certain type of mitigation measure is 
indispensable to avoiding catastrophic climate change. 
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Given these challenges, there are three pathways to turning international investment 
treaties into a tool to address climate change. First of all, it is crucial to avoid that treaty 
provisions limit the scope of host-state intervention in addressing climate change; in 
other words: To enhance a host state’s policy space, including strengthening the 
defence of necessity provision in the treaties. Secondly, treaties could become a tool to 
address climate change more generally by including some fairly comprehensive 
instructions to their parties regarding how to minimise the environmental impacts of 
investments in the energy sector – and possibly other sectors; how to promote 
cooperation in the research and application of environmentally sound technologies; and 
how to encourage favourable conditions for their transfer and dissemination (“do no 
harm” approach through environmental and social safeguards clauses). And thirdly, 
treaties should be designed to actively promote climate-friendly investments by using 
treaties as a lever to generate low-carbon FDIs. 
In practice this would mean preserving more policy space at the host-state level for 
promoting climate-friendly policies and incentives where possible, and to eventually 
insert specific safeguards in existing treaties to minimise environmental and climate 
impacts associated with FDIs. 
Concerning the third and more transformative dimension, to some extent the Clean 
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol can be regarded as a new type of 
international agreement to promote investments from developed-country investors into 
developing countries, with sustainable development being a central aim. However, CDM 
investments are propelled by the binding obligation of Annex B countries to the Kyoto 
Protocol to achieve compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments. No other investment agreement outside the UNFCCC context so far 
contains comparative obligations on developed countries’ investments.  
At the same time, the CDM remains quite controversial because of its significant 
backlogs in the verification, validation, and certification processes; its procedural 
complexities; and its pure market-based approach. Moreover, the CDM has a 
questionable record in practice, since cases of projects abound that undermine local 
sustainable development in the name of a difficult-to-quantify and -verify action against 
climate change (CDM Watch 2011). 
Drawing upon the controversial experience of the CDM and moving beyond this, 
investment treaties could contain a mechanism under which investments meeting the 
climate-friendly criteria specified in the agreement would be entitled to the agreement’s 
investment protections and/or investment incentives. Concerning the certification and 
validation, broad guidance would be set at the international level and specific approval 
would come from the host government. All investments that do not meet the climate-
friendly criteria would not be entitled to the agreement’s investment provisions. 
In the absence of a multilateral framework on investment and the high fragmentation of 
investment regulations, as well as the lack of binding multilateral treaties for emission 
reductions, it should be a high priority for governments to limit harmful climate 
implications of the existing investment regulations in any way possible. One proposal is 
to establish coherence between investment and climate policies through a new set of 
investment agreements at the bilateral or regional level.  
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However, a major limitation remains for climate-friendly technology transfer with existing 
provisions protecting IPRs and is today harmonised by the TRIPS agreement (Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) of the WTO. In particular, the role of 
limitations and exceptions to exclusive rights, which are contemplated in the TRIPS 
agreement, in facilitating access to new technologies – including environmentally sound 
technologies – remains highly contested in international fora, even as bilateral and 
regional trade agreements have steadily imposed constraints on the discretionary 
exercising of such policy options. Urgent action to rebalance the needs for coordinated 
innovation incentives and access to new products and technologies is needed. However, 
note that strong political will and consensus at the international level is currently lacking, 
as the recent and ongoing case on “TRIPS and health” has shown. 
Given the difficulty of reviewing and reforming WTO agreements in the short term, the 
only solution for developing countries is to exploit safeguards and exemptions within 
these agreements possibly by moving joint positions within the WTO concerning the 
review of the implementation of existing agreements, thereby creating precedents and a 
positive jurisprudence in this regard (TWN 2008). 
In addition, a specific role for public action and agencies in preventing that negotiations 
on new investment following the TRIPS prescriptions should be identified, so as to offer 
an alternative regime for the acknowledgement of innovations and intellectual properties. 
This alternative will be explored in chapter 5. Furthermore, as will be detailed in chapter 
6, the existence of export credit agencies is based on a systemic exemption from WTO 
agreements against state subsidies, so that similar general exceptions for public 
technology transfer mechanisms could be defined from the TRIPS agreement.  
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5. Policies for the South: Governing Investment Inflows 
To address the challenges and overcome existing barriers of technology transfer, it is 
essential to create the right framework conditions with incentives to create a large-scale 
technological shift towards a lower-carbon and more energy-efficient economy that also 
delivers affordable energy solutions. This shift relies both on scaling-up investment flows 
into the development and deployment of low-carbon technologies – which also requires 
adapting behaviours and lifestyles to favour these technologies – as well as on scaling-
down energy- and emissions-intensive investments that further lock economies of the 
South onto a fossil development path. 
Many low- and zero-greenhouse gas energy technologies to date are not yet cost-
competitive at scale without some combination of investment support mechanisms, 
technological advances, and regulatory regime improvements. A lesson learnt from the 
vast number of proposals to the CDM is that an abundance of potential projects, 
technologies, and investment opportunities alone will not necessarily materialize into de 
facto capital flows for implementation on the ground. Thus, although the private sector 
could offer innovative market-based solutions with no government intervention, in many 
cases, governments can accelerate or steer the process by creating adequate 
frameworks for investment, including specific regulations tailored to particular 
technologies and their stage of maturity.  
In particular, governments can play an important role in guiding private investments and 
transforming the conditions under which technology transfer takes place. The 
effectiveness and success of investment policies will depend upon integrating climate 
change issues into a wide range of strategic choices. National strategies to promote low-
carbon foreign investment- and related technology dissemination must be synergised 
across areas of policy-making, including energy, technology, industry, transport, 
construction, urban development, as well as social and environmental policies to ensure 
sustainability.  
Additional effort is required to create an enabling economic environment that takes the 
risk of developing new technologies and that allows for the rapid diffusion of new ideas 
and technologies (Tomlinson et al. 2008). Creating enabling market structures and 
regulations will facilitate the penetration of new technologies into the market and ensure 
that countries have the capacity to adapt innovations to suit their local circumstances. 
Government support for such technologies could contribute to creating economies of 
scale that reduce costs (Karakosta et al. 2010). In short, government intervention is 
needed to shape markets in order to develop domestic control over technology and 
economic processes in the long run in support of self-sustained development. 
A collection of possible policies for low-carbon technology transfer and investment 
governance is given in Box 3. In the following, five steps for creating an enabling 
environment and implementing appropriate policies will be suggested for helping to 
channel foreign and domestic private capital to climate-friendly sectors and meeting 
various criteria and objectives, including climate protection, economic diversification, and 
socially inclusive development. Such policies need to be ambitious and effective, 
credible and transparent, coherent and long-term, as well as economically and legally 
sound. Given the complexity of the challenge, there is no “one policy fits all” solution. 
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Policy interventions need to be adjusted according to the nature of the technology, its 
stage of commercial development, and the political and economic characteristics of both 
supplier and recipient countries.  
Box 3: Policies for low-carbon technology transfer and investment 
governance 
 
 Provide a technology needs-assessment and technology roadmaps to select the 
strategies most appropriate to the country, its capability, and technology options. 
 Establish national systems of innovation to develop absorptive capacity and an 
enabling environment for sustainable technology transfers. 
 Build targeted capacities and infrastructures, strengthening information access, 
awareness, education, and training for public and private stakeholders involved in 
technology projects. 
 Promote prototypes, demonstration projects, extension services, and technology 
dissemination through linkages between manufacturers, producers, and end-users. 
 Create the macroeconomic and market conditions to attract domestic and foreign 
investment, and facilitate technology transfer with benefits in adjacent sectors. 
 Strengthen economic diversification and job creation. 
 Demand that foreign investors support domestic capabilities and markets. 
 Incentivise new products and business opportunities through feed-in tariffs and 
other financial incentives. 
 Support and encourage initiatives for collaborative research, development, 
demonstration, and deployment.  
 Help to build facilities, networks, joint ventures, and partnerships across public and 
private sectors. 
 Attract private capital for selective foreign investments in line with national 
sustainable development strategies. 
 Define and enforce legal structures to encourage technology transfer and 
investment, addressing concerns about IPRs. 
 Create political stability and involve key stakeholders and social networks, including 
directly affected citizens and communities and civil society organisations. 
Building a science and technology infrastructure  
The basis of technology development and transfer depends upon its science and 
technology infrastructure, which comprises a set of specific, industry-relevant capabilities 
such as technology centres, research facilities, and educational institutions that support 
the development of technical skills (Justman and Teubal 1995, 260). Having a viable 
science and technology infrastructure in place is a prerequisite for the attraction of 
private investments. 
Investing in research and development is an essential precondition to build the 
technology infrastructure, and to augment the human capital of a country. Historically, 
governments have played a key role in supporting research and development through 
national laboratories, universities, training centres, and through international 
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collaborative ventures. Public funding remains a major source of R&D activities in both 
industrialised and developing countries, involving either general support to national R&D 
institutions and laboratories, or direct funding of specific projects to set government 
priorities. Effective RD&D policies alleviate technical barriers and reduce costs by 
improving materials, components, system designs, and tools for installers and users. 
Moreover, due to the failure of top-down and technology-centred approaches, it is now 
widely recognised that involvement of community institutions is an essential contribution 
to environmental projects and is therefore an important factor for successful technology 
transfer. The involvement of local government agencies, consumer groups, industry 
associations, and NGOs can help to ensure that the technologies being adopted within 
their particular country/region are consistent with their sustainable development goals. 
Besides the involvement of such community institutions, lessons from technology-
intensive economies teach that technology increasingly flows through private networks 
of information and assessment services, management consultants, financial firms, 
lawyers and accountants, and technical specialist groups. Governments can strengthen 
the growth of such networks for technology transfer through various initiatives, including 
(IPCC 2000): 
 expansion of opportunities to develop firms for management consulting; 
accounting; energy service; law; investment and product rating; trade; publishing 
and provision of communication; access to and transfer of information, such as 
Internet services; 
 encouragement of industry associations, professional associations, and 
user/consumer organisations; 
 participatory approaches to enable private actors, public agencies, NGOs, and 
grassroots organisations to engage at all levels of environmental policy-making 
and project formulation. 
Developing technology roadmaps and performance benchmarks 
Many projects in developing countries fail because they use technology that is 
inappropriate due to lack of capacity-building, ill-defined ownership, or lack of 
infrastructure. Any new technology framework should minimise this risk and ensure 
efficient diffusion of the appropriate technologies. Often there is a substantial lack of 
reliable statistical data on issues such as energy use, infrastructure, and demand. Solid 
data will “help policymakers design the most cost-effective policy options and impact 
assessments, while business can reduce uncertainty and thus risk premiums” (WBCSB 
2010). To overcome information barriers, governments have a key role in creating the 
necessary information assessment and monitoring capacity, supporting various options 
(IPCC 2000): 
  Develop improved indicators and collect data on availability, quality, and flows of 
technologies to improve monitoring of implementation. 
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  Develop technology performance benchmarks to indicate the potential for 
technological improvements. 
  Link information systems to international or regional networks through well-
defined clearing houses (such as energy-efficiency and renewable energy 
centres), information speciality firms, trade publications, electronic media, and 
NGOs and community groups.  
  Support technology information centres to overcome information barriers, and 
involve private information networks through specialised consulting and 
evaluation services. 
A comprehensive technology needs-assessment provides the understanding required for 
informed decision-making about future technology options in order to select the 
strategies most appropriate to the country, its capability, and technology options. This 
includes the identification and assessment of the specific needs for a technology and 
how that technology fits into the domestic environment. To fully undertake technology 
needs-assessments, developing countries might need administrative and technical 
support. 
Technology roadmaps help to draw future pathways in terms of capabilities, locations, 
and timelines. They prepare the ground for the promotion of technology prototypes, 
demonstration projects, and extension services through linkages between 
manufacturers, producers, and end-users. They also facilitate planning about the 
identification and development of solutions to technical, financial, legal, policy, and other 
barriers.  
A number of factors might affect host government’s prioritisation and targeting of foreign 
investment to boost prospects for technology dissemination. For instance, a government 
may identify targets by comparing potential growth sectors and assessing the country’s 
natural resources and created assets. For example, Morocco has chosen to enter into 
renewable power generation and environmental technologies manufacturing for a 
number of reasons (reduce its dependence on foreign fossil fuels, supply and export 
power, encourage rural electrification), and the choice includes an assessment of where 
the technology can best be secured, as well as an analysis of patterns of low-carbon 
foreign investment in the sector (WIR 2010).  
Creating climate-friendly market conditions 
Due to high unit costs, difficult management, as well as lack of markets and 
infrastructure, many new low-carbon products and services can only develop and 
emerge on a sustainable basis if they are supported by market-creation mechanisms, 
even if only on a temporary basis (WIR 2010). To overcome initial hurdles, economic 
incentives are required to compete with existing technologies that are more advanced in 
their lifecycle. As production costs of new pathways decrease over time and new 
products become attractive to more people, the need to support emerging markets 
declines and could be ultimately abandoned.  
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To realise the social and environmental benefits of technologies that will need time to 
become commercially viable, developing countries can implement policies that combine 
fiscal and regulatory measures by lowering costs and stimulating demand, thus steering 
investments into a more desirable direction. Governments can take various measures 
and tools to provide incentives for investments in sustainable energy technologies and 
become a catalyst for establishing new markets. There is a wide range of policies in 
place that support renewable energy around the world, including mandates and 
standards, innovation policies, and others. 
Governments should try to internalise external costs of climate-damaging activities as 
much as possible, in particular with regard to fossil fuels. The low price of fossil energy is 
a barrier that deters investment into renewable alternatives. Different approaches exist 
to “internalise” the environmental and social costs of fossil fuel use and to improve the 
competitiveness of cleaner energy sources (Dale 1995). Measures could include: 
regulations; energy or carbon taxes; emissions trading schemes; codes; standards; and 
removal of counterproductive subsidies (see below). Note, however, that taxes or 
emissions trading that create high energy end-prices are looked upon ambivalently in 
developing countries when poverty remains widespread. Yet, when energy-efficiency 
measures and appliances bring energy prices and consumer energy bills down, taxes on 
fossil fuel use can be implemented so as to “skim-off” net financial gains. In effect, fossil 
fuel costs would then remain stable while energy efficiency increases and absolute fuel 
use decreases. 
Complementary to taxes on fossil energy, tax incentives on renewable energies could be 
provided. For instance, developing-country governments could impose lower withholding 
taxes on payments abroad for intellectual property licences to encourage the use of 
intellectual property for low-carbon objectives. However, since public finances are 
usually low, tax rebates often are not an option. Even within the EU, tax-based green 
electricity support-programmes based on tax incentives are only applied in Malta and 
Finland. In most other cases (e.g. Cyprus, the United Kingdom, and the Czech 
Republic), tax incentives are only used as an additional policy tool (Karakosta et al. 
2010). Furthermore, such tax exemptions would increase dependance on external FDIs 
in the long run and would prevent a domestic renewable industry to develop soon. 
Another set of measures would seek to reduce energy needs by encouraging investment 
in low-carbon and energy-efficient production and transport systems (e.g. fuel-efficient 
cars and machinery) or by accelerated depreciation of existing assets (e.g. replacement 
of old cars and buildings, better insulation and cooling of buildings). 
Governments could revise public procurement policies in order to increase the purchase 
of low-carbon products and technologies by governmental as well as public institutions, 
thus providing new investors with the security of having a buyer for their products. For 
example, policies could be adopted requiring government buildings to use highly 
insulated windows, or requiring a certain percentage of public administration fleets to 
consist of electric vehicles. The setting of energy performance standards or mandatory 
energy labelling schemes can indirectly help create a market for new technologies.  
Renewable portfolio standards have been adopted to mandate utilities to include a fixed 
percentage of renewable energy within their overall generation portfolio by a certain 
period. This approach increases investor certainty about the size and time dimensions of 
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a country’s market for renewable energy. Developing countries such as Chile, India, and 
China have all successfully implemented such standards (REN21 2009). 
Electricity from renewable energy sources is promoted through tendering procedures 
that allow governments to place a series of tenders for the supply of green electricity. 
The winners of the tender agree to a contractual acceptance and compensation for the 
non-profitable part (which the government pays as part of the tender contract), which 
adds to the market price for electricity. While tendering systems theoretically make 
optimum use of market forces, their stop-and-go nature does not contribute to stable 
investment conditions. Within the EU, tenders for green electricity are mainly used in 
France and Ireland (Karakosta et al. 2010). 
Table 2: Global wind and PV capacity generated by feed-in tariffs as of 2008  
   Year FiT 
Created  
 Solar PV 
from FiT 
(MW)  

















 Australia*   Regional 1,1 0.01%  None  N/A 0.00% 
 Austria  2002 30,2 0.23% 2002 500 0.41% 
 Brazil   None  N/A 0.00% 2002-2008 319 0.26% 
 Bulgaria  2007 1,341 0.01% 2007 120 0.10% 
 Croatia  2007 0,048 0.00% 2007 1 0.00% 
 Cyprus  2003 2,089 0.02% 2003 0 0.00% 
 Czech Repub. 2002 54,3 0.42% 2002 150 0.12% 
 Denmark   None  N/A 0.00% 1993-2001 2500 2.07% 
 France  2001 91,155 0.70% 2002 3404 2.81% 
 Germany  1991 5351 41.16% 1991 23903 19.75% 
 Greece  1994 18,5 0.14% 1994 985 0.81% 
 Hungary  2003 0,45 0.00% 2003 200 0.17% 
 India   Regional 5 0.04%  None  N/A 0.00% 
 Ireland   2006  0 0.00% 2006 458,09 0.38% 
 Italy  1992 317,5 2.44%  None  N/A 0.00% 
 Kenya  2010 0 0.00% 2008 5,5 0.01% 
 Latvia  2008 0 0.00% 2005 23 0.02% 
 Lithuania  2002 0,05 0.00% 2002 65 0.05% 
 Luxembourg 1993 24,41 0.19% 1993 35 0.03% 
 Portugal  1999 67,95 0.52% 1999 2862 2.37% 
 Slovakia   None  N/A 0.00% 2003 5 0.00% 
 Slovenia  1999 2,15 0.02% 1999 0,019 0.00% 
 South Korea 2003 352 2.71% 2002 348 0.29% 
 Spain  1994 3404,76 26.19% 1994 16740 13.83% 
 Switzerland  1991 47,9 0.37% 1993 14 0.01% 
 Thailand  2006 6,2 0.05% 2006 0 0.00% 
 Turkey*   None  N/A 0.00% 2005 313 0.26% 
 Total    9,778,10 75.22%  52,950,61 43.75% 
 




Under feed-in tariff (FiT) systems, domestic producers receive a market price for the 
green electricity they produce; on top of that, they are paid the FiT, a specific subsidy 
per kWh produced. These schemes have the advantages of investment security and the 
possibility of fine-tuning as well as promoting mid- and long-term technologies. A variant 
is the fixed-premium mechanism, which offers a fixed premium or environmental bonus 
on top of normal or spot prices for electricity generated by renewable energy 
technologies. 
Feed-in tariffs, and similar performance-based incentives, have proven to be effective 
and efficient mechanisms for creating investor security and driving rapid renewable 
energy growth. By 2008, FiTs  supported 75 per cent of PV capacity and 45 per cent of 
wind capacity worldwide (see Table 2) (GET-FIT 2010). The large majority of this 
capacity is concentrated in developed countries, and particularly in Europe, but about 27 
developing countries have successfully adopted feed-in tariffs, including Thailand, 
Uganda, Kenya and South Africa (REN21 2009).  
The designs and effectiveness of feed-in tariffs vary widely, and some countries lack the 
financial strength, grid infrastructure, and/or regulatory frameworks for full policy 
implementation. There were proposed and legislated revisions to tariffs in 2010 to reflect 
falling technology costs and the continued adoption of feed-in tariffs in new regions. With 
costs falling rapidly for solar PV, adaptive out-of-cycle tariff adjustments to degressions 
and policy flexibility are realised. A number of organisations proposed global feed-in tariff 
funds and programmes (see Table 3) in preparation for the 2009 UN climate conference 
in Copenhagen. Most of these proposals recommended providing long-term premium 
feed-in tariff payments. Reviewing these proposals, the public-private partnership “GET 
FiT” developed a high-level concept to financially support policy structures that 
appropriately adapt best practices to national contexts as part of broader, low-carbon 
development strategies (e.g. NAMAs, Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action). 
As an alternative to feed-in tariffs, a green certificate system could be installed. In 
addition to the electricity market price, an extra price is paid for each certificate issued as 
a proof of origin for the power produced. As compensation, end-users or power 
producers of fossil fuel-based technologies must purchase certificates from green 
electricity producers. Currently, in Sweden, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and 
Poland, a green certificate system is operational, which also has the aim to compensate 
green electricity producers for the difference between the costs of production and the 
market price for electricity (the non-profitable part). Unlike feed-in tariffs, utilities could 
generate these certificates by switching from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources in 
their own electricity production, but they could also buy such certificates from green 
electricity producers. End-users can be also asked to submit green certificates by the 
end of the year, showing that they have purchased the required amount of green 
electricity during that year. In cases where a utility or end-user is not able to submit the 
required amount of certificates by the end of year, a penalty must be paid for non-
compliance. These penalty revenues are generally either used for research and 
development of renewable technologies, or transferred to the general government 
budget. Technologies with a long-term sustainable energy potential, but which require 












Services provided Proposed screening 
criteria 
Feed-in Tariff Fund 
Emissions Trading 









• Taxes on cap and 
trade  
• CO2 trading 
revenues  
• Multilateral and 
regional banks  
• Existing Kyoto 
mechanisms  
• Pays premium  
• Technology 
differentiation  
• 20-year contracts  
• Paid based on actual 
generation  
• Environmental 
standards (e.g. CDM)  
• Guaranteed grid 
access  
• Feed-in law  
• Transparent data 
access  
• Clear planning and 




Project Catalyst  
• ETS auction 
revenues  
• Concessional debt 
and government 
guarantees  
• Developed country 
contributions 
• International 
maritime and aviation 
levies  
• Assigned Amount 
Unit (AAU) auctions  
• Bi- or multilateral 
Climate Partnerships 
Agreements 
• National trust funds  
• Global green fund 




strengthen safety nets) 
• Fast-start fund to 
finance capacity-
building  
• Global oversight 
body  
• Pays premium  
• In conjunction with 




• Low-carbon growth 




and need for additional 
support  
• Monitoring, reporting, 
and verification (MRV) 










EC Joint research 
centre  
• National budgets  
• Multilateral banks  
• Varies by ownership/ 
regulatory structure:  
• Rural energy service 
company 
• Independent power 
producers (IPP) model
• Concession model  
• Pays premium  • Fair grid access  
• Feed-in law  
• Renewable energy 
policy  
• Clear planning and 
licensing procedures  
Renewable Energy 




• IMF SDR or  
• Existing funds: 
Emissions auctions, 





Policy Fund and state 
budget/ CDM tax  
• Global Environment 
Facility trust fund or  
• World Bank Climate 
Technology Fund or  
• National Renewable 
Energy Policy Fund  
• Pays premium  
• Can also be 
extended to mini-grids  
• Sufficient and steady 
fund source  
• Separation of fund 











Services provided Proposed screening 
criteria 
Global FIT-  
 Programme  
 
Ad Hoc Working 
Group on Long-
term Cooperative 












Renewable Energy  
alliance  
• Obligatory annual 
contributions from the 








• Pays premium  
• Large-scaled micro-
credit and soft loan for 
off-grid and non-
electrical systems  
• Alternative 
integration into NAMA  
  
  
• Avoid additionality 




Global feed-in tariff 
fund UN DESA  
• Emissions auctions  
• REDD 
• Levy on carbon 
market transactions 
• Reallocation of 
revenues from fossil 
fuel subsidies to 
renewable energies 
• Country contributions 
based on criteria  
 • N/A  • Guaranteed 
purchase prices for 
existing generation 
units; lower rate for 
new projects 
• Yearly payments 
based on actual 
generation  
• KWh subsidy 
reduction linked to 
scale and learning 
economies 
• Appropriate legal and 
regulatory framework 
• FiT scheme 
coordinated with 
grid/off-grid expansion 
and targeted subsidies 
for the poor  
Source: GET-FiT (2010) 
Engaging the banking sector and regulating financial markets 
To overcome the lack of financing for technology transfer in developing countries 
(Manas 1990), governments could take action to demand that banks and other lending 
institutions finance environmentally sound technologies and projects. The banking 
system plays a dominant role in the allocation of capital, and its health determines 
whether a country will be able to exploit any benefits from financial services, including 
access to and transfer of technology. To address some of the problems of the banking 
sector, such as poor capitalisation, risk aversion, inadequate regulations, preference for 
investment, and corporate financing vs. project financing, macroeconomic policies would 
aim to reform the sector, for example through increased reserve requirements and/or 
adoption of different risk-weighted capital requirements (Friends of the Earth Europe et 
al. 2011). Innovative financing mechanisms and alternative banking practices would 
reduce the risks to lenders to allow for profitable investments in environmentally sound 
technologies for greater energy efficiency in developing countries (Pachauri and 
Bhandari 1994) (CRBM 2011). 
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In this context, consideration should be given to the establishment of public “green 
development banks” (WIR 2010). These could open credit markets, motivate business to 
invest, and enable clean-energy technologies to be deployed on a large scale and 
become commercially viable (Podestra and Kornblum 2009). Compared to existing 
incentives, such as public loan guarantees or tax rebates, a green development bank 
would have the advantage of being more flexible in addressing critical barriers to 
investment. It would allow for tailor-made solutions as opposed to the more rigid tax 
regulations and other official government programmes. Another approach that may be 
considered is the creation of “green” funds, which provide funding to local firms at 
concessionary rates. For example, Kenya has announced the creation of a green energy 
fund to help firms and other institutions to generate clean energy and manufacture 
energy-efficient light bulbs and other appliances (WIR 2010).  
Beyond this, it is necessary partly to regulate financial markets, in particular to build 
shock absorbers into the financial system and develop mechanisms to respond to 
instability. A variety of measures have already been considered and partially 
implemented in response to the economic crisis. These include restraints on high-risk 
ventures; taxes on international financial transactions; building international reserves at 
levels that are adequate to the variation of capital; fiscal flexibility to respond to rapid 
changes; building cushions into the banking system using periods of credit booms to 
increase bank capitalisation. 
More broadly, a reintroduction of capital controls – as of yet implemented only by a few 
emerging economies – could be a powerful tool, not just to enhance financial stability 
(IMF 2011) but also to equip national governments in selecting inbound FDIs by 
rewarding low-carbon investments. 
Deepening linkages, networks, and partnerships 
To what degree and at what speed domestic companies acquire technology through 
foreign investors depends on the type, scale, and quality of the interface that exists 
between them. The type of interface may involve joint venture partners, competitors, 
suppliers, and public-private partnerships (WIR 2010). Some governments are keen to 
promote joint ventures, since this interface between transnational corporations and 
domestic companies can often result in effective transmission/acquisition of 
technologies: Both parties have reciprocal knowledge and assets to share (e.g. 
transnational corporations may possess low-carbon technology, while its domestic 
partner has the tacit know-how about local industrial customers). However, joint ventures 
require high levels of mutual trust between partners, as well as transfer/absorption 
capabilities (Demirbag and Mirza 2000).  
Other approaches that are less driven by projects initiated – or even driven by 
transnational corporations – utilise a more bottom-up, collaborative process in which all 
relevant stakeholders are engaged to jointly determine the technology selection and 
implementation path consistent with that country’s/region’s sustainable development 
goals for one or more sectors. In this approach, domestic companies and governments 
could enhance initiatives for collaborative research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment. These could include bilateral or multilateral collaborations between 
countries and companies in order to share lessons learnt from experience with new low-
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carbon technologies. One such activity being conducted on a bilateral basis by the 
United States has been the Technology Cooperation Agreement Pilot Project, which was 
established in 1997 to enhance climate change technology cooperation with developing 
and transition countries. Until it was abandoned, the Technology Cooperation 
Agreement Pilot Project facilitated voluntary partnerships of Brazil, China, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, and the Philippines with the United States and other OECD countries, 
international donors, and the private sector. Established in 1995, the Climate 
Technology Initiative is a multilateral approach pursued by 23 developed country Parties 
and the European Commission in support of the UNFCCC. The Climate Technology 
Initiative maintains a network of partnerships with non-governmental organisations, 
international organisations, and the private sector. 
Moreover, developing countries can enhance technological cooperation amongst 
themselves, for example in their geographic regions. A promising opportunity is the 
establishment of Regional Technology Synergy Centres to formulate and coordinate a 
coherent programme responding to the demands, opportunities, and options in low-
carbon technologies in developing countries. A regional basis to these centres 
recognises that many issues (e.g. low-carbon electrification, transport infrastructure, and 
housing for burgeoning rural and urban populations) are common features across 
developing countries and have regional ramifications; although Regional Technology 
Synergy Centres will also have national windows and be allied internationally (including 
with existing R&D centres as well as with other Regional Technology Synergy Centres). 
With the participation of both domestic firms and foreign affiliates, local technological 
and industrial clusters can help enhance the exchange of knowledge and manpower and 
the establishment of joint ventures between local and international companies, which 
serve as incubators for the development of low-carbon industries and capabilities, as 
highlighted in the case of the Binhai New Area in China (WIR 2010). 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) can be a helpful mechanism to facilitate the 
development and deployment of new environmentally-friendly technologies and to adapt 
them to local circumstances. However, while PPPs in theory can offer some avenues for 
cooperation, a substantial rethinking of the business and contract models are needed to 
ensure that they move into the right direction in the future. PPPs were at the centre of 
negotiations at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002, but 10 
years after, relatively few successful cases can be reported. Among other things, PPPs 
have been criticised for their failure to help benefit the poor and for not being 
economically sustainable in the long-run – given the too often relevant losses they 
dumped on public finances. Therefore, the success of PPPs would depend on “coherent 
PPP policies providing clear directions to investors and donor countries, a coherent legal 
and regulatory framework, transparent public decisions and selection of partners, and a 
commitment to sustainable development. Investors’ legal rights and the rights of the 
public in case of investment disputes also need to be protected.” (WIR 2010: 63) 
Investment contracts can lay the foundation for PPPs related to the development and 
deployment of low-carbon technologies, such as large-scale renewables-based power 
generation or joint research activities. This would require legally balancing investors’ 
rights and public interest rights. 
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6. Policies for the North: Reforming Export Support 
Foreign direct investment from advanced economies – and increasingly from emerging 
economies – strongly benefits from the support of national export credit agencies, which 
by financing and guaranteeing exports and insuring long-term investments significantly 
reduces commercial and political risks for investors and companies. In the last decade, 
the role of these agencies has been increasingly scrutinised by governments and civil 
society as a possible mechanism to deliver climate financing and, more generally, as a 
source of action for climate protection and sustainable development. Therefore, it is 
crucial to analyse whether these agencies could be reformed according to this 
perspective and, eventually, which alternatives and more effective mechanisms could be 
established for the same purpose. 
Export credit agencies are quasi-governmental institutions, export-promoting 
instruments, and an integral part of many national governments’ industrial, foreign aid, 
trade, and investment promotion strategies. They are national agencies offering either 
direct credit or financial cover (through insurances and guarantees) to national 
companies involved in international trade transactions or foreign direct investments. 
Their prime objective is to eliminate risk for exporters and investors. This risk is borne by 
the ECAs and ultimately by their governments. As leading players in project financing (in 
particular, large infrastructural and industrial projects), ECAs, by and large, provide 
guarantees for financing the trade and investment of commercial banks. At the same 
time, ECAs hedge their risk by requesting counter-guarantees from developing 
countries’ governments, which in case of default could be activated to transfer a new 
debt into their public finances. 
Export credit agencies play an important role in supporting about 10 per cent of all global 
trade flow each year. At present, there are more than 80 countries with some kind of 
ECA, with the OECD representing 33 of them. Some countries (e.g. Indonesia, Ukraine, 
and Kenya) recently took steps to launch their own export-import banks. The 51 
members of the Berne Union2 covered more than $1.5 trillion worth of business in 2008; 
the total volume of export credit guarantees provided in the period 2004–2009 by the 
ECAs of the EU Member States was €468 billion (Fern 2010a). Following the financial 
and economic crisis after 2009, G20 governments even strengthened the role of export 
credit agencies in order to help the global recovery. They committed $250 billion in 
support of trade financing – regarded as short-term trade transactions up to two years. In 
comparison, with the Cancun Agreement of 2010, all industrialised countries announced 
an increase in climate finances on the order of $100 billion per year by 2020.3 
Promotion of national exports through export credit support is sometimes legitimised on 
the grounds that it is essential to counter export credit support using other governments, 
thus to compete on an equal footing with foreign exporters (self-defence instrument). 
However, export support is also legitimised with reference to market failures in the 
private trade finance sector. It should be pointed out that, in any case, export credit 
agencies are the only institutions able to cover political risk – something that private 
                                                      
2 The Berne Union is the International association for the export credit and investment insurance industry. 
3 http://www.climatesfundupdate.org. 
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insurance markets cannot intrinsically do. As such, ECAs offer support for export 
transactions that would not be offered – or not at affordable prices – by the private 
sector. This is due, among other things, to the fact that the private capital market lacks 
sufficient information to properly assess the risks and opportunities of the transaction. Is 
this not the exact problem as when new, or not-yet-profitable, climate-friendly 
technologies enter new markets and aim to reach profitable levels and broad-scale 
application? 
It is clear that export support is a kind of subsidy using a broad definition, regardless of 
how much such support distorts market functioning. Therefore, the subsidy dimension 
could be appealing for those willing to use existing national financial institutions to 
generate climate financing, in particular by leveraging private capital markets. Indeed, 
export credit agencies have been mentioned as a possible mechanism to generate 
climate financing in the context of climate negotiations. Given the still unclear definition 
of climate financing – in particular as concerning its relation vis-à-vis overseas 
development assistance and other public commercial funding – few governments, 
among them the United States and Japan, mentioned in their schedule for “fast start” 
financing for climate change some possible contributions from their export credit 
agencies. European governments, by contrast, have not yet announced plans to 
advance the use of ECAs for climate financing purposes (Fern 2010b).  
To be sure, this paper does not suggest that export support is a prime means to 
implement international climate financing commitments. Neither does it assume that 
ECAs in their current institutional state are by and large ready to enhance the transfer of 
low-carbon, sustainable technologies. This paper rather starts from a different position: 
As long as large amounts of public money – funds that are significantly higher than what 
is currently envisioned as climate financing – continue to support international 
investments and the kinds of technology transfers that are not particularly climate-
friendly, or that are even climate-damaging, it will remain difficult to achieve multilateral 
climate protection goals. The key question therefore is: Can public export support be 
transformed and used in a way that it serves as one instrument among others to 
promote low-carbon technology transfer? 
Limits of export credit agencies in supporting sustainable development 
Given that no country can unilaterally decide to stop subsidising export credits without its 
exporters losing sales, there exists an important incentive for drafting multilateral 
disciplines. In 1978, negotiations finally resulted in the Arrangement on Guidelines for 
Officially Supported Export Credits (OECD Arrangement), which seeks to foster a level 
playing field for officially supported export credits. Moreover, export credits have to be 
WTO-compatible. In particular, the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures regulates and disciplines the use of subsidies in international trade, and 
includes officially supported export credits to some extent. The agreement prohibits a 
broad selection of export subsidies for non-agricultural products.4  
                                                      
4  The two relevant items from the “Illustrative List of Export Subsidies” are: Item (j) which refers to the 
provision of export credit guarantees or insurance at “premium rates which are inadequate to cover the 
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The recent complaint formally made at the request of the US steelworkers’ union by the 
US government to the WTO against the Chinese government on the alleged distortion of 
trade practices to support China’s domestic wind power industry is quite paradigmatic of 
all challenges related to the possible use of ECAs to support climate mitigation actions. 
In short, US workers and companies claim that “China has utilized hundreds of billions of 
dollars in subsidies, performance requirements, preferential practices and other trade-
illegal activities to advance its domination of the sector”5 and this translates into overly 
favourable terms for the Chinese renewables industry in its export to the United States. 
To date, consultations on the dispute at the WTO between all parties – including the EU 
and Japan, who joined the complainants – are pending. At first, climate campaigners 
were shocked by such a complaint against an environmentally-friendly, large-scale move 
by Chinese authorities, after a decade of attacks against the Chinese government for its 
bad environmental, social, and labour records and dumping practices within the global 
economy. Furthermore, this complaint contradicts the strong push – within the current 
Doha Round trade negotiations – by Northern governments for liberalising trade in 
environmental goods and services in order to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers for 
climate and environmentally-friendly products worldwide. But once the dust has settled, 
the case raises key questions about the functioning of the global economy and the 
sustainability challenges faced by those participating in it. 
Regardless of what the WTO dispute settlement mechanism will decide in the end, this 
case reminds us that ECAs provide quite important subsidies that can help develop new 
industries by making them more competitive nationally and on global markets. Secondly, 
technology transfer is no longer an issue just for Northern industries, despite that they 
are still leading in industrial innovation; emerging economies can also play a role in this 
regard, in particular towards poorer developing countries through “South-South 
cooperation”. Thirdly, the green economy will become a more competitive territory for 
industries, and not just at the national level, but globally. Competition according to 
existing trade and investment rules will not necessarily help to promote the growth of 
low-carbon international investments. Therefore, it is legitimate to wonder whether an 
exemption from the current global trade regime is needed for some investment and trade 
transactions dealing with climate-friendly operations and technologies. 
Indeed it is vital that ECAs are subject to consistent and effective scrutiny and control. 
They are an increasingly important tool for government intervention in the economy, and 
in practice, they have demonstrated a significant potential for social and environmental 
harm. However, it is evident that much of this activity goes unreported, or unobserved by 
those who have responsibility for the oversight. Very little information is publicly available 
about the decision-making processes for projects supported by ECAs. As a 
consequence, it remains difficult for parliamentarians and the wider public, both 
domestically and in host states, to monitor ECA operations. Information is hardly 
available regarding critical decision-making and oversight functions including: ECA 
project categorisation; how ECAs assess the social, environmental, and human rights 
                                                                                                                                                                 
long term operating costs and losses of the programmes”; Item (k), which refers to the provision of export 
credits “at rates below those which they actually have to pay for the funds so employed … or the 
payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining 
credits” is a prohibited export subsidy, “insofar as they are used to secure a material advantage in the 
field of export credit terms.”  
5  http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wto-wind-industry-throwdown-u.s.-vs-china1/ 
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risks associated with projects; how ECAs gauge ongoing project compliance; the results 
of post-approval monitoring activities; and any sanctions that ECAs apply for non-
compliance. 
Commercial projects that ECAs have supported quite often posed the substantial risk of 
negative impacts on human rights. The political risks against which ECAs insure 
companies include: civil war, social unrest, political coups, or the sudden changes in 
government contexts often associated with increased risks to human rights. ECAs also 
frequently support industries of a particularly invasive nature, such as oil, gas, and 
mining, which are often associated with environmental damage and a degradation of 
human rights, through violence; the forced displacement of people; violations of the 
rights of indigenous peoples; and denial of access to basic services. 
More specifically, ECAs adopted in 2003 the OECD Common Approaches on Export 
Credits and the Environment, which require ECAs to perform an environmental and 
social due diligence by screening projects ex-ante, disclose some information about 
expected impacts and mitigation actions, and reference some international standards 
regarding project implementation. So far implementation of the Common Approaches 
has been controversial and, according to civil society and other analysts, has failed to 
establish a level playing field among different ECAs, both in terms of disclosure and 
standards applied. Furthermore, Common Approaches still fail to include relevant 
international standards, lack adequate and independent monitoring, and have a non-
binding status, which strongly limits their full implementation (ECA-Watch 2011). 
At the September 2009 G20 summit in Pittsburgh, governments committed to end fossil 
fuel subsidies. However, ECA-supported transactions remain a frequent and substantial 
source of support for the exploration, processing, and combustion of fossil fuels. ECA 
financing for these activities has grown tremendously over the last 15 years (Fern 
2010c) and now exceeds fossil fuel financing by all multilateral financial institutions 
combined. Yet, despite the Pittsburgh decision, during the days of the Copenhagen 
Climate Summit in December 2009, the governments of the United States, Italy, and 
Australia agreed to provide $18 billion through their respective ECAs to build the gigantic 
and highly controversial Papua New Guinea Liquefied Natural Gas project.6 
Can export credit agencies have a role in fighting climate change?  
Despite this controversial carbon record of ECAs, some governments – the United 
States and Japan (Fern 2010b) – have decided to count some ECA support as “climate 
finance” according to “fast start” commitments made in Copenhagen at the end of 2009 
regarding the three year period 2010–2012. So far none of the European governments 
have made a similar commitment.7 
                                                      
6 “U.S. Ex-Im Bank Undermines U.S. Credibility at Copenhagen by Confirming $3 Billion in Financing for 
ExxonMobil Fossil Fuel Project,” press release, Pacific Environment, Oil Change International, 9 
December 2010, available at: http://www.pacificenvironment.org/article.php?id=3190. 
7  See also http://www.germanclimatefinance.de. 
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At the same time, since 2008 negotiations have been ongoing at the OECD to include 
“climate-friendly technologies” in the existing annex to the arrangement, which was 
agreed in 2004, in order to give enhanced terms for the official support of renewables 
and water projects (OECD 2011). At the moment, the different requests by governments 
are ongoing in the negotiations about which technologies should be eligible under the 
new annex. 
Today’s controversy about the definition of the new annex to the OECD Arrangement on 
“renewable energy, climate change mitigation and water projects” (ECA-Watch, 2011) 
shows that ECAs have structural limitations for becoming “climate finance institutions” 
and their transformation would imply a fundamental revisiting of assumptions about their 
structure and functioning, thus making it impossible, as argued below. However, in the 
current review of the OECD Common Approaches on Export Credits and the 
Environment – which define non-binding environmental and social safeguard policies for 
ECAs – several governments showed a strong interest for including an ex-ante 
accounting of projected greenhouse gas emissions associated with operations financed 
by ECAs, in order to improve ECAs’ carbon portfolios.  
Still it seems questionable whether ECAs are adequate institutions to promote low-
carbon FDIs. ECAs are national agencies that strongly respond to national interests. 
Their mandate is very clear in this regard. Even before the 2008 recession, their 
mandate in some countries was reviewed to allow ECAs to support operations that did 
not involve any national exporter, even though it was regarded as strategic for the 
national interest (such as an oil or gas pipeline contributing to the energy security of the 
ECA’s country); nearly the totality of ECA support is aimed at supporting national 
industries competing globally – both in terms of trade and FDIs. This rigid set-up clashes 
with the overall approach of climate financing, as currently being discussed in climate 
talks. This is aimed at backing climate mitigation and adaptation interventions, 
regardless of which country the companies are from. 
Furthermore, concerning technology transfer, it is widely acknowledge that in the long-
run, beneficiary countries should develop their own industry of climate-friendly 
technologies. This would require financial support for joint ventures between companies 
from developed and developing countries as well as for new established economic 
actors of developing countries. Current rules on “local content” for ECA operations – 
under the OECD Arrangement – limits the percentage of official support benefiting local 
providers or sponsors to 30 per cent.8 Similarly, only few countries have substantially 
lifted limitations for the so-called foreign content – that means the involvement in ECA-
backed operations of beneficiary companies from a third country that is not the ECA’s 
country or one of the project host’s countries. 
It should be added that ECAs do not – and realistically will never be able to – have a 
development mandate, contrary to other bilateral and multilateral financial institutions 
                                                      
8  The OECD arrangement on export credits requires a minimum 15 per cent down payment on supported 
sales of goods and services, limits the covered percentage to 85 per cent of the related export contract 
value (exclusive of local content), and allows for support of local costs associated with the export (up to 
30 per cent of the value of the export contract, with prior notification to other OECD countries if such 
support for local content exceeds 15 per cent of the export contract value). 
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that have an expressively stated mandate with several implications. In particular, if we 
were to apply the aid-effectiveness principles9 to ECAs, it would soon be evident that 
ECAs do not operate according to a development rationale or internationally agreed 
upon development goals, regardless of whether some operations supported by them 
might contribute to these indirectly or without any intended scope. 
It is particularly important to focus on the ownership principles, which require that aid 
recipients should forge their own national development strategies with their parliaments 
and electorates, without any substantial interference according to donors’ own national 
interests.  
It is clear that this could not be the case for ECAs. If we look at them from a governance 
and decision-making perspective, it is clear that decisions are taken only by the home 
country, at the request of the exporter, and without informing the host countries – apart 
from when agreements about the sovereign counter-guarantee requested to this should 
be finalised. 
It is important to point out an additional structural limitation of ECAs. These agencies, 
despite the significant public cover they offer, tend to follow market dynamics – they 
assess whether to support specific operations only when national exporters or investors 
approach them. In short, ECAs have no interest in shaping markets and could only offer 
enhanced terms for some specific types of operations in a few cases, such as with some 
renewable energy projects. 
This limitation has emerged very clearly on several occasions when – at the national 
level – governments have committed to supporting more small and medium enterprises 
after different actors criticised ECAs for their primary focus being on backing large 
corporations in international trade and investments. Despite several commitments from 
ECAs to dedicate ad hoc instruments to improve their performance in this regard – 
including the agreement of framework guarantees for major private banks, which could 
then act as intermediaries in covering small and medium enterprises’ exports – little has 
been achieved as compared with the importance that small and medium enterprises 
have played in several advanced economies. This lack is mainly due to the structural 
inadequacy of ECAs in having a proactive stand in scoping for specific companies and 
operations to be supported, given their passive stand towards market functioning and 
the obligation not to distort international trade beyond what was agreed under the OECD 
Arrangement and WTO agreements. At the same time, ECAs operate more and more as 
market entities and they are interested in minimising their transaction costs in order to 
break even, as requested by international regulations. This implies that ECAs have 
substantial problems in engaging most of their portfolios into a large number of small 
                                                      
9  The Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action are founded on five core principles, born out of 
decades of experience of what works for development, and what does not. These principles have gained 
support across the development community, changing aid practice for the better. It is now the norm for 
aid recipients to forge their own national development strategies with their parliaments and electorates 
(ownership); for donors to support these strategies (alignment) and work to streamline their efforts in-
country (harmonisation); for development policies to be directed to achieving clear goals and for 
progress towards these goals to be monitored (results); and for donors and recipients alike to be jointly 
responsible for achieving these goals (mutual accountability). 
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operations, which is often what is required to support small and medium enterprises or 
some industrial sectors, such as renewable energy. 
ECAs also have structural limitations, as concerns the possibility of supporting climate 
adaptation interventions. As a matter of fact, developing countries request financing for 
such operations to be based on grants or highly concessional lending, although this 
issue is not sufficiently clarified in the UNFCCC and its implementing Kyoto Protocol; it 
has also not been clarified in the recent Copenhagen Accord and Cancun decisions. It 
could be argued that many adaptation measures require infrastructure building, which is 
a kind of activity often supported by ECAs. However, ECAs lend or offer a cover at 
“quasi-commercial” terms, far away from concessional financing. 
Above all, probably the bigger limitation for ECAs in playing a role in climate financing 
derives from the letter and the spirit of international agreements that govern their 
functioning. As said above, ECAs should abide by the WTO regime, which is centred on 
an overarching non-discrimination principle for guaranteeing free trade outside the realm 
of an international community’s commitments on any other public interest matter, as 
defined within the United Nations system. It is evident that climate stability and the fight 
against climate change must take into account the public’s interests. This limitation 
repeatedly emerges in the context of the Doha Round negotiations at the WTO. Here, 
the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements and trade agreements 
are discussed, and similarly measures to foster international trade of so-called 
environment goods and services are negotiated.10 In both cases, after 10 years of 
negotiation very little progress has been achieved. In the case of environmental good 
and services, the key instrument discussed is the improvement of market access, 
including the reduction and elimination of non-tariff barriers, which, however, are not 
able to reward this sub-sector more than others – assuming that WTO negotiations 
progressively aim to slash tariffs and barriers in all sectors sooner or later – in particular 
through additional financial support, or subsidy mechanisms, which are strongly 
opposed, according to WTO logic. 
Looking at the OECD Arrangement, current negotiations around the Annex on 
renewables and climate-friendly technologies – and parallel discussions at the G20 
about the extension of the operationalisation of the G20 commitment to phase out public 
support for fossil fuels, including ECAs – show how the overall rationale that generated 
these agreements is not compatible with a significant boost for public support for 
international climate action. In fact, the OECD Arrangement is centred on the logic of not 
penalising any technology and simply considers under which limited circumstances 
could better financial terms be given to some sub-sectors. In the history of the 
Arrangement, this has led to better terms – longer repayment periods, lower interest 
rates – for different kinds of technologies, mainly on the basis of economic reasons. 
Under the existing provisions in the Arrangement, this is the case for large-scale fossil 
fuel power plants and even more for nuclear power plants. However, the Arrangement 
has never penalised any other technology on environmental, social, or human rights 
grounds. According to producers and exporters of environmentally sustainable and low-
                                                      
10  These negotiations deal with the reduction or elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental 
goods and services – for example catalytic converters, air filters, or consultancy services on wastewater 
management. 
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carbon technologies, subsidising these is often not enough if public support and 
subsidies are present also for high-carbon and high-impacts technologies (EREC 2003). 
In some cases, where new technologies are already mature, just slashing subsidies for 
the old and more damaging technologies would be sufficient to generate new market 
dynamics. This applies also to national legislation that still includes support for high-
carbon technologies and fossil fuels. 
Therefore, according to a “do no harm” approach and in the spirit of the G20 
commitment on phasing out subsidies for fossil fuels, it is still worth pushing ECAs to 
curb subsidies they give for high-carbon technologies and projects, for instance by 
phasing out ECA support for fossil fuels. This would open more opportunities for low-
carbon technologies, regardless whether these would benefit from ECAs or other public 
support. 
However, on the basis of what has been explained above, ECAs cannot be reformed to 
be instruments of climate financing, nor as new mechanisms to promote low-carbon 
FDIs. It is then legitimate to wonder whether other or new public institutions would be 
appropriate and effective in supporting international investments in climate mitigation. 
Principles for fair and effective support  
Notwithstanding these structural problems in reforming export credit agencies, and given 
the deficits of the current intellectual property rights regime, public support remains a key 
tool for fostering foreign direct investments for climate-friendly technology transfer. 
Indeed, public intervention is needed also for promoting a new effective framework 
approach on this matter. What are key principles for such a new framework to foster low-
carbon and sustainable foreign investments?11 
First, participatory governance that is at least based on North-South parity is a pre-
condition for giving strong legitimacy to new institutions. At the same time, it is important 
that relevant stakeholders sit in advisory boards that can regularly inform and interact 
with decision-makers. Beyond just some private-sector representation, it is crucial to 
give voice to social actors representing the sectors of society most impacted by climate 
change and by mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Second, in order to avoid that any new financial support to developing countries 
generates new debt – which would be on top of the existing financial debt – no counter-
guarantees to developing countries should be required to distribute risks associated with 
sovereign lending from industrialised countries. As a result, advanced economies will 
take greater risks than beneficiary countries, given their historic climate debt.12 This, 
however, is in line with the obligations of industrialised countries to afford the 
“incremental costs” that developing countries face when applying climate-friendly 
technologies.  
                                                      
11 Key principles for climate finance have, among others, been developed by Schalatek (2011). 
12 http://www.climatedebt.org. 
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Third, given the highly competitive environment at the global level, it would be best for 
new agencies to have a multilateral set up, or at least a regional set up – for instance, as 
a new European Agency for Technology Transfer – in order not to be liable under WTO 
agreements for distorting global markets. If an overall multilateral legal framework for 
establishing new institutions for “technology development and transfer” were agreed at 
climate talks, such agencies could play a prominent role in this framework. Yet it is not 
very likely, and may not be recommendable, that discussions about establishing new 
agencies should be negotiated under the almost “more than full” UNFCCC agenda. 
What could be feasible, however, is that UNFCCC negotiations take note of such 
agencies being set up, and acknowledge their necessity to achieve climate policy goals.  
Fourth, new institutions should operate with a selective approach, both in terms of 
technology development and types of projects they support, sectors they operate in, 
and, most importantly, in terms of financial instruments they use and related investments 
they promote. According to what has been discussed previously in this paper, new 
institutions should contribute to enhance mechanisms for capital control (both outward 
from home country and inward in host country) and the tracking of investments 
throughout their implementation, while promoting selected flows in support to verifiable 
low-carbon investments. As a matter of fact, we are already facing speculative 
investment in low-carbon technology sectors – with renewable energy and wind power in 
particular – which are short-term-oriented and not related at all to the ultimate goal of 
promoting a long-term shift towards a low-carbon economy.13 
Finally, the new agencies should be public in terms of their governance, legal set-up, 
and the way they gather and administer financial resources. Furthermore, agencies 
should act in the public interest at all stages of their operations, so that all collective 
interests in society are taken into full account. In this regard, it is advisable that national 
parliaments – and in the case of the EU, the European Parliament – give formal 
oversight power in the statutes and procedures of the new agencies, including accounts 
and budget approval and the definition of strategic directions each year. 
On the basis of these five key principles, it is worth concentrating on how a multilateral 
agency for technology transfer could operate, starting from the governance dimension 
and the eventual regional remit and scope of operation. 
The case for a European Agency for Low-Carbon Technology Transfer 
At the climate summit in Cancun in December 2010, in order to strengthen technology 
development and transfer, governments decided to establish a Technology Mechanism, 
which should be fully operational in 2012. The mechanism includes a Technology 
Executive Committee, which will strengthen the development and deployment of new 
technologies, as well as strive to increase public and private investment in technology 
development and transfer. The Technology Executive Committee will also assist in 
providing an overview of needs for the development and transfer of technologies for 
                                                      
13 Add example of wind power in India and institutional investors, IPOs, etc. 
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mitigation and adaptation. Additionally, it will recommend policies and actions to boost 
technology cooperation. 
The Technology Mechanism also includes a Climate Technology Centre and Network to 
facilitate national, regional, sectoral, and international technology networks, 
organisations, and initiatives. The Climate Technology Centre and Network will aim to 
mobilise and enhance global clean technology capabilities, provide direct assistance to 
developing countries, and facilitate prompt action on the deployment of existing 
technologies. 
Within the spirit of these commitments and the new Climate Technology Centre and 
Network, European governments could advance an innovative proposal of establishing a 
ground-breaking regional agency for fair and equitable low-carbon technology transfer. 
How could such a specific European agency work in practice, both financially and in 
terms of identifying specific investments to be supported? 
The adoption of a fair and representative governance structure would necessarily require 
the establishment of a new institution as trustee and administrator of the funds. In the 
case of the European Union, this could happen by setting up subsidiaries of existing 
institutions whose 50 per cent of capital and ownership would be given to developing 
countries. The Lisbon treaty would allow for the establishment, for instance, of 
subsidiaries of the European Investment Bank, with the participation of other entities. 
A new regional agency for low-carbon technology transfer could raise resources on 
financial markets through the issuance of sovereign bonds fully guaranteed by 
industrialised countries. Specific EU climate bonds would be issued under the sovereign 
guarantee of Member States – and eventually by the governments of Switzerland, 
Norway, and Iceland. Resources raised would be allocated specifically to the agency, 
which would be given a banking mandate as a financial agency. Bonds would be 
accessible for institutional investors, governments, as well as for citizens at the retail 
level. In order to incentivise bond purchases and long-term commitments, a specific 
public certification could be given to those investors significantly investing in these 
“climate bonds”.  
The agency can lend to public and private entities as well as concede guarantees and 
insurances against commercial and political risks associated with specific investments. 
Resources from budgets of the EU Member States and other governments would 
contribute to the agency in order to subsidise interest rates or lower premiums. The 
operations of the agency, as in the case of multilateral development banks, would not be 
requested to comply with the OECD Arrangement on export credits or other limitations 
imposed by the OECD and the WTO. In short, these multilateral or regional agencies 
would operate under a general exception from the WTO regime, comparable to the one 
enjoyed by ECAs. 
In short, this mechanism would resemble what the European Investment Bank does 
today, with the addition that a structural blending of government resources and funding 
raised on the markets would take place. The fact that no sovereign counter-guarantee is 
requested for beneficiary countries would be an incentive for carrying out an adequate 
due diligence for investments. It would represent a contribution to the repayment of 
climate debt in the case of possible defaults and the eventual need to replenish the 
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agency’s coffers to honour debt contracted on the financial markets. According to the 
same principle, it would be up to industrialised countries to contribute, if needed, to pay 
full interest to agency bondholders. 
The agency would focus on both the innovation as well as the access and dissemination 
of low-carbon technologies, balancing between these two main areas of operation. 
Concerning technology innovation, the agency would support investment in research 
and development on a specific and targeted list of technologies. As the agency acts with 
public money, it could request from companies that the outcome of the research be 
patented by the agency under a Creative Commons-type of licence, through which no 
licensing costs would be applied to developing countries that use them properly.23 At the 
same time, the agency would sign a protocol with each company/institution financed for 
research and development investment, defining under which conditions – including 
capping the price for access to the new technology to be developed – the licence could 
be used in the framework of private commercial investments.  
In the case of access to existing low-carbon technologies, the agency will adopt 
compulsory licences – that means shareholding governments will force the holder of a 
patent, copyright, or other exclusive right to grant use to the state or others. The holder 
will receive royalties determined through some form of arbitration on a case by case 
basis and will be financed with grant contributions from budgets of the EU Member 
States and other governments. This is possible under the safeguards included in the 
WTO TRIPS agreement if it is proved that the threat posed by climate change to national 
security triggers a “defense of necessity”. Once the patent is “acquired” by the agency, it 
would be handled similarly to new patents developed through investment backed for 
innovation under the Creative Commons regime. 
The agency would support primarily research and development and access to 
technologies for small-scale alternative interventions benefiting local communities. In the 
case of technology related to individual large-scale investments and projects, these 
should fall both within national development and climate plans and strategies, and be 
eligible under a selected and limited list of technologies to be regularly reviewed and 
updated by the advisory board and then adopted by the board of the agency. 
Country action plans detailing priority technology developments and interventions should 
be developed by national governments. They should have the full involvement of local 
administrations and all stakeholders, in line with multilateral guidelines approved and 
regularly reviewed by the agency board.  
Each investment shall undergo a due diligence by the agency staff, including ex-ante 
disclosure of information in a timely manner and the consultation of any interested or 
affected actors in the investment. The host country could exert a veto on the project, 
upon the condition that adequate justification would be provided as to why the project 
conflicts with national plans. A fair and transparent dispute resolution mechanism 
between the host country and the agency board should be available for settling eventual 
disagreements and facilitating conciliation, including third-party involvement. 
Both in the home and host countries, it is vital to put in place from the very beginning 
transparent, independent, easily accessible, and effective accountability mechanisms for 
directly affected communities and organisations representing the diffuse interests in 
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home and host countries that are willing to redress decisions by the agency board on 
specific projects, programmes, and policies. However, these mechanisms would not 
replace existing law remedies but complement them. 
In the case of a European agency, the European Ombudsman, which is elected by the 
European Parliament, could be tasked with this specific role. A similar accountability unit 
could be established in developing countries – under the premises of national 
parliaments – as country offices of the accountability mechanism. However, the 
European Ombudsman should be directly accessible by individuals and organisations 
from developing countries as well. 
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7. Conclusions: Towards a Global Green New Deal 
Preventing climate change and sustainable development on a global scale will require 
radical technological, economic, and societal changes in both developed and developing 
countries. Economic development is most rapid in developing countries, but it will not be 
sustainable if these countries follow the historic emission trends of developed countries. 
Although most new carbon abatement technologies are being developed in industrialised 
countries and most of the mitigation action is located there, much potential for low-
carbon energy production and emission reductions is located in developing countries, 
too. Renewable energy investments in the developing world sometimes deliver lower 
abatement costs than in the developed world, while also achieving a broad range of 
additional social, economic, and environmental co-benefits. Thus, a sustainable 
transition of global energy and industrial systems to lower carbon emissions depends 
upon a much intensified North-South collaboration (Ipsen et al. 2001) and the successful 
transfer to – and absorption of – low-carbon technologies within developing countries 
(Mallett et al. 2009).  
In responding to climate change and moving towards a low-carbon economy, developing 
countries are facing two major challenges: first, the mobilisation of needed financing and 
investment; and, secondly, the acquisition, generation, and dissemination of relevant 
technology (WIR 2010). In both areas, foreign investment can make valuable 
contributions. While the future international climate change regime – including specific 
emission-reduction commitments and obligations for financial and technological support 
to developing countries – is still to be agreed upon, countries need to examine whether 
and how to facilitate low-carbon foreign investment. First of all, this will include 
technology transfer from North to South, but the transfer from and within the South as 
well as South-North should be considered. 
The core idea of this study is to build public support to unleash private capital for foreign 
investments in the global North while establishing sustainable framework conditions to 
maximise the mitigation and development potential of these investments in the global 
South. In this context, foreign investments can be a valuable tool to support the transfer 
of technology and related know-how and capacities, if an enabling environment is 
established. Private investments must be attracted by new opportunities to overcome 
limited demand or market size while companies’ financial risks must be reduced by 
public money and new regulation and standards to make foreign investments work for 
climate protection. To operationalise such a “virtuous cycle”, different steps are required 
by the North and South, affecting both the public and private sectors. A summary of 
proposals prepared by this study is given in Table 4. 
  
  50
Table 4: Summary of actions and incentives for the public and private 
sectors in the North and South  





• Reduce the role of current export 
credit agencies. 
• Build new institutional mechanisms 
that promote foreign investments to 
make them work for climate protection 
and sustainable development that will. 
• Raise public money to support and 
leverage climate-friendly foreign 
investments so as to insure investments 
against financial and market 
instabilities, incentivise investments into 
markets with limited demand, and thus 
make investments attractive, even 
where returns on investments are 
expected to be low.  
• Support should be offered to 
companies, e.g. renewable energy 
companies that aim to invest in 
countries with low production 
capacities.  
• The level of support should 
significantly raise companies’ interests 
to go abroad. 
• Only those investments should be 
supported that conform to the highest 
standards at home. 
• Both public and private money raised 
may be used by countries to fulfil their 





• Implement strong, stable, transparent, 
coherent, credible, and ambitious long-
term enabling environments. 
• Develop domestic technology 
roadmaps that identify countries’ 
nationally appropriate mitigation 
actions.  
• Establish investment policies to 
effectively govern foreign investment 
inflows. 
• Design these policies in a way to 
maximise foreign investments’ 
mitigation potentials as well as 
economic diversification and 
sustainable development.  
• Setting the stage for sustained 
economic growth as “green growth” and 
“energy autonomy” through domestic 
renewable energies have more long-
term prospects than “fossil growth”. 
• Provide opportunities for economic 
diversification by catalysing foreign 
capital to climate-friendly sectors. 
• Foster ownership and competitive 
strength of domestic/local companies in 
the global market by demanding foreign 
investors engage in joint ventures and 
purchase local goods.  
 
Weaving together the complementary challenges of investment support in the North and 
investment governance in the South could be seen as a “Global Green New Deal” in 
global climate policy. According to the United Nations Environment Programme, such a 
Global Green New Deal aims for “reviving the global economy and boosting 
employment, while simultaneously accelerating the fight against climate change, 
environmental degradation and poverty.”14 While the UN approach suggests a globally 
coordinated effort to address these challenges, measures on a national level could be 
either used to support this goal well before global agreements have been achieved, or to 
implement obligations arising from new agreements.  
While the merits of such an integrated approach can best be realised if ambitious 
mandatory emission-reduction obligations are set and implemented, they do not 
                                                      
14  See http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GlobalGreenNewDeal. 
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necessarily depend on a global agreement. Note that neither investment support nor 
investment governance will be managed by a global fund or facilitation, but will take 
place at the national level between countries. This bilateral investment support and 
investment governance approach intends to give each country’s national policies – 
which set up the framework conditions for technology transfer – as much authority as 
possible. Global top-down decisions and one-size-fits-all prescriptions on the kind of 
technologies best supported can be avoided. Moreover, the approach suggested in this 
paper favours bottom-up approaches and fosters the bilateral and regional collaboration 
in the fight against climate change. 
In any case, increased cooperation for low-carbon technology transfer will bring about 
major benefits for all sides. For the climate crises cannot be solved unless developing 
countries – and in particular the dynamic ones – immediately start to follow a low-carbon 
development path, avoiding further lock-in in carbon-intensive infrastructures and 
technologies. At the same time, the pace of action to curb emissions in developed 
countries needs to increase if the requirements of climate science are to be met. Public 
support for those domestic companies and initiatives that foster low-carbon technologies 
is absolutely key. Providing new forms of support for low-carbon foreign investments will 
achieve two goals at the same time: It fosters the sustainable energy transition at home 
and takes on the responsibility of co-financing low-carbon development in the rest of the 
world.  
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